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Esteemed Rector Magnificus and Madam Dean of the Faculty of Law,
Dear colleagues and students,
Dear family, friends and guests,
 
1. From Practice to Theory, an Introduction
In 1971, one year after Milton Friedman dismissed CSR and claimed 
that the only responsibility of business was to increase its profits, I 
joined Philips’ Corporate Legal Department in my first job as a company 
lawyer. Although the acronym CSR was virtually unknown in 1971 on this 
continent, it was the year in which the initial signs of a wakening notion 
of the CSR concept in the Netherlands could be noticed. As a young 
lawyer and unaware of Friedman’s doctrine, I had to deal with important 
developments, in 1971, concerning the legislation governing corporations 
and their activities, which we now would characterize as CSR- or, more 
practically, Triple Bottom Line or Triple P- (People, Planet, Profit)1 inspired. 
Let me give you a short account on each of these P’s.
In the People field the so-called Structure Regime of 1971 codified the 
stakeholder model in Dutch company law and brought for the first 
time the labour factor into the structure of big companies by providing 
the employees with the right to codetermine the composition of the 
supervisory board. The act also codified case law2, which had ruled 
that the supervisory board should conduct its tasks in the interest of 
the corporation, which was not the interest of the collectivity of 
shareholders, and it made major management decisions subject 
to the supervisory board’s approval, thereby securing indirectly the 
employees’ influence on these decisions. In addition, the employees, 
represented by their unions, could request the Enterprise Chamber 
of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to order an inquiry into the 
management of the company, the outcome of which could result in 
the court’s finding of mismanagement with wide-ranging corrective 
powers by the court. Finally, the position of labour was reinforced 
by the new Works Councils Act 1971, allowing the works council 
to appeal at the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals against those contemplated major corporate decisions, to 
be taken against or without the positive advice of the works council, 
which could affect the position of the workforce. This complex of far 
1  John Elkington, “Cannibals with forks – The Triple Bottom Line of the 21st Century Business”, 
 Oxford: Capstone Publishing Limited, 1997. 
2 Doetinchemse IJzergieterij, HR 1 april 1949, NJ 1949, 465.
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reaching new legislation was the result of a long consultation process 
under the central notion “societal embedding of the enterprise” 
(my translation of “vermaatschappelijking van de onderneming”). 
Finally, I mention the heavily debated but not adopted VAD 
(vermogensaanwasdeling) proposals by the labour unions to let the 
employees share in the value added to the company’s equity in the past 
financial year.
Also regarding the Planet field important legislation was introduced 
regulating emissions into the air and discharges of industrial waste 
into the surface waters.3 The concerns regarding the environment, 
sparked by the famous book “Silent Spring” by Rachel Carson, made 
the Board of Management decide, also in that same year 1971, to 
establish a high level corporate committee on environmental policies, 
the “Concerncommissie Milieuhygiene” (in English Group committee 
Environmental Policy). This committee consisted of senior-executives 
of the relevant Corporate Departments and, surprisingly, me as 
the youngest arrival at Legal. Shortly after I had commenced this 
activity, estimated by the Legal leadership as 5% of my time, it 
became clear that at least half of the more than 100 Philips 
establishments (inrichtingen) in the Netherlands were in need of legal 
support in obtaining or revising their environmental permits based 
on the new legislation. This was a massive task bringing lots of 
negotiating experience in obtaining these legal licences to operate. 
One of the surprising findings of the committee was that it would be 
problematic to disclose to the outside world the substantial savings 
in production costs which Philips’ new environmental policy had been 
able to achieve. We feared criticism from civil society for alleged wrong 
motives of our new policy, being a narrow profit-related self-interest 
instead of a sincere concern for the preservation of the environment. 
The idea, that green policies and healthy profit could go hand in hand 
and result in a win-win situation, was highly unfashionable at the time.
Concerning the Profit field the dismissal, at the time of my arrival, of one 
of the senior managers of the Finance Department who had used inside 
information for personal gain, came as a shock. Although at the time the 
use of inside information was not regulated in Europe4,
3 Wet van 13 november 1969, houdende regelen omtrent de verontreiniging van oppervlaktewateren, 
 Wet van 26 november 1970, houdende regelen in het belang van het voorkomen of beperken van  
 luchtverontreiniging.
4   Kristen 2004.
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the internal Philips rules against such use were very strict. The most 
striking experience in the Profit field, however, was a litigation I had to 
manage. We received a writ of summons from one of the most respected 
Amsterdam lawyers. He represented a Lebanese agent, hired to support 
Philips in obtaining a contract for a major telecoms project in Jordan. 
Although the transaction had not materialised, the agent claimed 
his commission of some millions of guilders asserting that Philips as 
principal was to be blaimed, because the project was not carried out 
although full agreement had been reached. Checking the facts I found 
that the project was to be financed by the Jordanian Government with 
US development funds. A couple of days before the official signing the 
Jordanian authorities, however, had cancelled the ceremony. It appeared 
that the US funds had been withdrawn by the US Government based on 
a complaint by US competitor AT&T, that US funds should not be used to 
finance a project with its non-US competitor Philips. The lawyer argued, 
that Philips should have sued the Jordanian Government in its courts 
asking that the government be ordered to sign and execute the contract 
based on the full agreement having been reached. To my objection 
that a court order by a Jordanian court to the Jordanian government to 
proceed with the project was inconceivable, the lawyer responded in all 
seriousness that it would have been completely normal and accepted 
in Jordan to bribe and pay the judge and that there were no legal 
impediments to do so. He obviously didn’t share my view that the Dutch 
courts would have a problem in following his line of reasoning and he 
appeared quite confident of winning the case. The end of the story was 
that we agreed, out of court, to reimburse the agent for his costs, which, 
by the way, we had offered to him already before he started the case. The 
idea, however, that a company like Philips should bribe a judge to obtain 
a positive ruling, was appalling to us even if it was not illegal at the 
time. Law and morals or ethics apparently were two different domains, a 
theme that has divided legal philosophers and scholars to this day and 
to which I shall revert later in my lecture.
During my 36-year tenure as a company lawyer many more 
developments in the relationship between business and society as 
well as personal experiences in my corporate law advice practice 
generated a deeper interest in and influenced my thinking about the 
theoretical underpinnings of law, regulation and ethics in the business 
context. It inspired me to write an article in 2005 on the legal aspects of 
CSR, criticising the prevailing approach by governments and business.5 
5  Eijsbouts 2005.
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Little did I expect at the time, that this “innocent” article would lead 
to the appointment in the capacity which I accept today with this 
inaugural lecture. Hence the first reason for the title of this introduction 
“from Practice to Theory”. The second reason is the complementary 
nature of colleague Sybren de Hoo’s lecture and mine. He focused on 
CSR in practice, or CSP for Corporate Sustainability Performance. My aim 
today is to try and illustrate why and how law and, in a broader 
context, regulation is relevant for CSR and, in turn, CSR is relevant for 
law. This is in particular relevant in view of the still prevailing position 
of governments and the business community, that CSR is voluntary 
or “beyond legal compliance”, as it is technically termed. The definition of 
CSR used by the EU Commission reads: 
“a concept, whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis”.6 
Sybren de Hoo has provided us in his lecture eloquently with ample 
arguments from an empirical point of view against this “voluntarism”. 
For my part I intend not only to add normative arguments against 
this “voluntarism”, but also to provide ideas for a normative legal and 
regulatory underpinning to the concept of CSR as a central theme 
in today’s relationship between business and society.7 After this 
introduction I will share with you during my lecture the following topics:
-  CSR and substance: social norms
-  CSR and form: legal pluralism
-  CSR and Law oxymoron? 
-   CSR; norms, practices and foundational underpinning: the licence 
to operate
-   Reinforcing the licence to operate: changing the paradigms in 
corporate law 
-  From Practice to Theory to practice; Epilogue
-  Acknowledgements
6  EU definition of CSR: Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper Promoting a European  
 framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2001) 366 final, Brussels, 18-7-2001. In later policy  
 documents this definition was maintained. See for the Netherlands SER 2000 and SER 2008a
7  Mullerat 2005, entitled “Corporate Social Responsibility, the corporate governance of the 21st century”.
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2. CSR and substance: social norms
2.1 The CSR debate
Let us for a start take a closer look at CSR. What does it address or 
cover? In a wider context it covers the relation between business 
and society, which is a multifaceted subject of philosophies, theories, 
policies and practices in different disciplines. Antony Burgmans, 
former CEO of Dutch-English multinational Unilever and chairman of 
the Governmental Advisory Commission on the relation of CSR and 
Corporate Governance, gave the following description: “CSR in its core is 
nothing more than decent business (in his Dutch description “fatsoenlijk 
en netjes ondernemen”), perceived as such by society”.8 This description 
contains two relevant aspects. Is CSR’s core of decent business conduct 
all there is to it and can we leave the topic to scholars in business ethics 
or does CSR contain more than this core and, if so, what should it be? 
And how does the qualification “as perceived by society” impact on 
the substance? Will society simply wait and hope for the best leaving 
important decisions to the market? The basic idea of the CSR concept 
is that business firms are a vital part of society and that they have both 
the power and the responsibility to conduct their affairs in ways that 
satisfy not only shareholders, but also other constituencies such as 
employees, customers, the environment and the community at large. 
As recent developments in the field of climate change, the financial 
and economic crisis, the possible negative impact of business operations 
on human rights and the environment as well as the rapid depletion 
of natural resources have shown there is every reason to take a closer 
look at business’ responsibility to contribute to a sustainable future. 
Is there a role for business in sustainable development, defined as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”?9
Burgmans’ decent business as the core of CSR in itself points to ethical 
behaviour as such, but is of course insufficiently descriptive as basis for 
this complex notion which may become clear when I quote the textbook 
which we used this year for the CSR course in the Master Globalisation 
and Law: 
8  Burgmans 2008; see also Triple Value & Rinnooy Kan 2008, the research report for Burgmans 2008.
9  World Commision on Environment and Development (“Brundtland Commision”) – Our Common  
 Future (1987).
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“The positive and negative impacts that business had on society 
generated public, political, and academic debate. While it was clear 
that business sought a profit from providing goods and services in 
response to society’s demands, it was much less obvious what constraints 
should be put on its activities and who should impose them. Was all profit 
legitimate? Was all profit legitimate, provided that the company stayed 
within the law? What was a fair distribution of the wealth business 
created between shareholders, employees, and wider society? Should 
companies give part of their wealth back to the communities within which 
they operate? Could markets be relied upon to set a fair price, whether for 
labor, products, or natural resources? Could governments reliably decide 
what was in the public interest?”10
All these questions relate to the substance of CSR and both in academia 
and in practice these questions have raised much debate and controversy. 
Major corporate scandals during the last ten years culminating in the 
current financial and economic crisis have triggered more pointed 
discussion on the responsibilities of business in general and the 
financial sector in particular. In Burgmans’ description, the business 
practices giving rise to these developments were certainly not perceived 
as decent by society. So an avalanche of legal, regulatory and even self-
regulatory responses11 was the result and many question nowadays 
whether these reactions are sufficient. The introductory words of 
the report on the EU Conference “Towards a greater understanding 
of the changing role of business in society”12, held in 2010, exemplify 
this by the following statement:
“Public trust in business was shaken as never before and fundamental 
questions were raised concerning not just the regulation and public 
accountability of business but also its values, its culture and its 
relationship with stakeholders. Furthermore, it gave an additional 
impetus to the trend to redefine the responsibilities of business not 
as responsibilities to the traditional constituencies of shareholders, 
employees, suppliers and customers but also to a much broader 
range of stakeholders at a global level, and indeed, even the physical 
wellbeing of the planet itself”.13
10  Blowfield Murray 2011, p. 7.
11  Cf. Code Banken, 9 september 2009 (www.nvb.nl).
12  EU CSR Conference, April 2010 “Towards a greater understanding of the changing role of 
 business in society”; ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/events-102-presentations_en.html.
13  Report mentioned in note 12.
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This trend, identified at the conference, to redefine the responsibilities 
of business as including even the physical wellbeing of the planet, 
would of course lead to an almost impossible task for business to live 
up to in general and for me this afternoon to consider in particular. It 
will, however, prompt us certainly to think “out of the box” or, if you 
will, “out of the lawyer’s comfort zone” and, I’m afraid, even “out of the 
business person’s comfort zone”.  
2.2 CSR characteristics
Now, for a start, you would expect of course a definition of CSR. I am 
asking, however, for your patience, since, as Sybren de Hoo has already 
illustrated, one of the still heavily discussed issues in CSR is what it 
actually means. Like corporate governance CSR is still in search of 
its paradigm.14 Depending on the discipline and background of the 
discussant, academic or practitioner, philosopher, politician, economist, 
management theorist, sociologist or lawyer, the chosen conceptual 
foundation of CSR and the preferred definition vary considerably. An 
analysis of the many15, definitions of CSR resulted in the following core 
characteristics of CSR16, which these definitions for the major part 
appeared to share17:
- Voluntarism, implying that CSR exclusively covers the domain 
 “beyond the law”; 
- Internalizing or managing externalities, to account for the total 
 cost of business in the market prices for its goods and services;
- Multiple stakeholder orientation, to balance fairly all impacts of  
 operations on people;
- Alignment of social and economic responsibilities, to balance fairly  
 financial and social benefits;
-  Practices and values, to put the CSR practices in the right values context; 
-  Beyond philanthropy, to adopt CSR as a core function in business  
 strategy and policy rather than as a bolt-on nicety.
My task this afternoon is to address these characteristics through a 
legal lens and to provide perspectives for governance and law, corporate 
14  Tricker 2009, p. 233 and van Oosterhout & Heugens 2008, p. 197-223, who argue that CSR in its more  
 than 50 years of existence has not been able to establish a reliable scientific framework and hence  
 suggest to forget CSR altogether, since other, well established, frameworks address the issues  
 commonly labelled as CSR. 
15  Carroll & Shabama 2010, p. 89, refer to a study by Dahlsrud in 2006 who identified 37 definitions.
16  Crane, Matten and Spence 2008, p. 7-9. 
17 Cf. also the elements De Hoo has provided as essential elements for a CSR description, De Hoo 2011, p. 15. 
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law in particular. To focus on the substance of the CSR norms I return to 
John Elkington’s Triple P concept, mentioned in my introduction: People, 
Planet and Profit. How can we make this concept operational from the 
point of view of substantive norms? 
2.3 Exploring the Triple P landscape
In my introduction I referred already to several examples for each of the 
three P’s.18 Let us now take a closer look at society’s expectations in each 
of the three P’s:
People in a business context refers first of all to employees and covers 
such aspects as fair labour and employment conditions, consultation 
and co-determination on issues which affect the position of the 
company’s most valuable “assets”, its employees, and, more and more 
important in an international context, the safeguarding of a wide range 
of human rights in an employment context.19 Moreover this P relates 
also to avoiding harm to third parties, which may be affected by the 
operations of business, so-called indirect stakeholders as Freeman has 
first mentioned them.20 He defines stakeholders as those individuals 
or groups who may be affected by or may affect the policies and 
operations of corporations. The most pertinent category of norms to 
be safeguarded in this context are these third parties’ human rights, 
individually and collectively. We shall look more closely to this category 
of CSR norms later in this lecture.
Also Planet has two dimensions. It refers to the rapid depletion of 
essential natural resources, such as the rain forests, water, food (think 
of fish, palm oil), energy and other vital elements for the planet’s 
future sustainability. Sybren de Hoo showed you not only current global 
overconsumption but also its highly unequal distribution patterns. 
Moreover, it covers the protection of the environment. Traditionally, 
of course, that meant water, air and soil, but already for quite some 
decades it also means the greater natural systems, which are increasingly 
affected by human activity such as the climate and the ozone layer. 
18  See for an extensive listing of the each of the 3P elements de Hoo 2011, Annex 1, p 57-59. Another  
 instructive approach is provided by Hoskins 2008, who distinguishes the following CSR elements:  
 community, employment, environment, marketplace, business relationships and human rights, p. 66.
19  Van den Heuvel 2009
20  Freeman 1984: stakeholders are persons and organisation who affect or are affected by the 
 coprporation’s polices, decisions and actions; primary stakeholders are those stakeholders who are 
 vital for the corporation and without whom the corporation cannot function, the other stakeholders  
 are called secondary stakeholders
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The Montreal Protocol has successfully addressed the latter. A similar 
result for our climate is still beyond the horizon. 
The final P, Profit, relates to the way profit is obtained and reported. 
Decent business in this context means making a reasonable profit 
conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law 
and those embodied in ethical custom. You may be reminded by this 
description of the famous (or infamous?) Friedman Doctrine already 
referred to: a corporate executive’s …. “responsibility is to conduct the 
business in accordance with his employers’ (read “shareholders’”, JE) 
desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible 
while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied 
in law and those embodied in ethical custom.21 Friedman deviates 
in two important aspects from my description. Reasonable profit is not 
as much money as possible and Friedman’s basic rules of society are very 
narrowly conceived. This last P implies above all a sustainable business 
model based on inter alia fair competition, no bribery and correct 
profit recognition (no cooking of the books) but also fair disclosure.
According to John Elkington’s claim, the overarching remit of CSR is 
the requirement that business strikes the right balance between the 
three P’s. This balance has two dimensions: the dimension of a fair 
cost allocation among the stakeholders and the dimension of a fair 
distribution of the business results among the stakeholders. Here 
we touch on the CSR characteristics: internalizing or managing 
externalities, multiple stakeholder orientation and alignment of 
social and economic responsibilities, which I mentioned before.22 We 
shall later turn to these characteristics in the context of law and 
regulation and in particular the assurance of “do no harm”, a negative 
connotation, and “wealth creation and distribution”, a positive 
connotation. This resonates with two of the main functions of law and 
regulation, the protective function on the one hand and the enabling 
function on the other hand.23
21  Friedman 1970. 
22  See p. 12.
23  In his article ”The future of legal theory” Zumbansen distinguishes 5 roles or functions of law: “Law  
 as an institutionalised system of rule enforcement, Law as a means of stabilising expectations, 
 Law as a means of oppression, Law as hope, Law as an empty shell–without (proper) method, heart  
 or soul …? The first definition demands a particular framework in order for something to be called 
 ‘law’. It refers to the institutionalisation of creating, implementing and interpreting law. Law is thus 
 removed from other rules and behaviour-governing norms such as religious beliefs, ritual rules, or 
 ‘social norms’”. Zumbansen 2011, page 327.
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2.4 First conclusion: CSR, a bowl of multiple substantive social norms
What should the general conclusion be about the substance of the CSR 
norms and their identification? First of all, that there is no such thing 
as a “one size fits all” substantive notion of CSR. From a substantive 
point of view CSR is a container of multiple social norms relating to a 
whole series of topics and issues in the Triple P field, which may vary 
not only among different industries but also in time and place, not least 
due to the perceptions of society (or better put societies) as rightfully 
observed by Antony Burgmans. These perceptions are by their nature 
subject to constant change with the evolution of business, advancement 
of technology, and not least the emancipation of civil society actors. 
This all has become more clear and pressing since the unanimous 
endorsement by the UN Human Rights Council of the Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework proposed in 2008 by the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
Harvard Professor John Ruggie.24 Ruggie clearly distinguished and 
specified the state duty to protect and the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights. This corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights is not a legal responsibility as Ruggie posits, but a “universal 
baseline expectation” from society, so an uncodified social norm. 
The third pillar of his framework relates to adequate remedies, 
both judicial and non-judicial.25 Among the latter he emphasized 
the importance of company grievance procedures for stakeholders, 
including mediation. In June of this year the equally unanimous 
endorsement of his Guiding Principles for the implementation of his 
Framework by the Human Rights Council followed.26 In the analysis 
leading up to this framework, Ruggie had identified a very broad range 
of instances, in total over 300, in which corporations had violated, 
or assisted in the violation by states, of human rights.27 His Guiding 
Principles 2011 specify how corporations should live up to their 
responsibility to respect human rights. The key-word is “risk based 
due diligence”: corporations should on a continuous basis assess, 
whether and in what ways their actual or intended operations run 
the risk to impact on the human rights of others and take preventive 
or remedial steps. This assessment of the relevant substantive CSR 
norms is a process of contextualization: each company will have to 
24  Ruggie 2008, Pitts & Sherman 2008.
25  Rees 2008.
26  Ruggie 2011.
27  Ruggie 2008, Schweisfurth 2011.
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28  How to do business with respect for human rights, a guidance tool for companies. 
 available at  www.gcnetherlands.nl.
analyze its position based on its specific industrial characteristics and 
the given societal context and this in a continuing dialogue with the 
relevant stakeholders in that same context. An oil company obtaining 
or using a production licence in an agricultural or forest region in a 
developing country has a different CSR profile than when it obtains 
and/or uses a production licence in deep waters. And this in turn is 
quite different from a pharmaceutical company opting to do its clinical 
testing in a developing country rather than in its home country. An IT 
company, in turn, has a different CSR profile when it opts to outsource 
its production to a developing country than when it sells an internet 
access system to a country with a totalitarian regime. Sybren de Hoo 
provided in his lecture tools for this CSR assessment process in general. 
In addition, ten Dutch multinationals participated in 2010 in a UN Global 
Compact Dutch Chapter project to test the implementation of Ruggie’s 
Framework relating to human rights in particular. The resulting tool was 
well received by the UN Human Rights Council.28
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29  Conference organised by the OECD in cooperation with G20 chair France on 27-28 April 2011 in Paris.
30  Another striking figure produced by an OECD study is the average 10% increase in prices for products  
 and services world wide as a consequence of violations of antitrust laws. 
31  The Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.This Declaration was  
 adopted by the Governments of OECD Member countries on 21 June 1976. It was reviewed in 1979,  
 1984 and 1991.
3. CSR and form: legal pluralism
3.1 Introduction
Having explored the substance of the CSR norms, let us now address 
the form in which these norms can manifest themselves. Substance 
and form for lawyers are two important if not essential notions. Let 
me illustrate this distinction with an example. In my introduction I 
mentioned the court case of the Lebanese agent against Philips: the 
issue was whether we should bribe the judge in order to pursue our 
business goals and secure the agreed transaction. Bribing foreign 
officials at the time - we are speaking of the early seventies of the latest 
century - was not illegal, but it was and still is highly unethical according 
to our social norms: you simply don't bribe, so the substance of the 
norm is clear. Bribery, however, is a widespread evil with far reaching 
consequences for the ideal of justice and fairness. As recent examples 
have shown, even well regarded multinationals, such as Siemens, ABB, 
BAE and Philips among many others, still cannot control all of their 
employees in their quest for the best deals. At the recent OECD/G20 
anti-corruption conference29 OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría stated 
that the total amount of bribes paid worldwide is estimated to be not 
less than 5% of global GDP!30
3.2 The crystallization of social norms; the anti bribery norm as example
Let me give you a picture of society's reaction to this phenomenon 
since our Jordanian telecoms case in the early seventies of the last 
century, when bribery of foreign officials was not regulated at all. Also in 
those days, multinationals were not always considered good corporate 
citizens, another CSR inspired term as we shall see, and the public cry 
for more regulation was loud and clear. When in 1976 the member 
states of the OECD, a so-called Intergovernmental Organisation or 
IGO, reached agreement on a Declaration on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises31 providing for protection of the 
international investments by multinationals, it was felt that the other 
side of the coin, decent behaviour as quid pro quo, should also be 
Corporate responsibility, beyond voluntarism18
addressed. It was the push for the OECD member states to agree 
also on the first edition of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises as a complement to the Declaration.32 These guidelines 
are widely considered the first comprehensive international CSR 
instrument, dealing with such issues as disclosure, competition, 
financing, taxation, employment and industrial relations, environmental 
protection, science and technology. These topics were preceded by 
general principles. Principle 7 read: multinational enterprises "should" 
not render - and they "should" not be solicited or expected to render 
- any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to any public 
servant or holder of public office. Mind the word "should" in this 
principle. One would expect here the word "shall" as imperative, but the 
OECD member states had committed to each other to only recommend 
to their multinationals to abide by the OECD Guidelines. So they 
were non-binding. In legal jargon this is called "soft law". There are 
various definitions of soft law, but all of them share the common 
characteristic that as statements or declarations by organisations of 
states or international governmental organisations they represent 
authoritative opinions on principles and practices that may have legal 
effect.33 This legal effect may be twofold. It may assist the national 
courts in their interpretation of national law for instance in the 
application of so-called open or blanket norms. It may also assist 
legislators, international and national, in their design of future 
legislation. So for the first time the substantive norm "don't bribe 
foreign officials" was codified, albeit not in a legally binding way, but 
with possible legal effect.34
Inspired by the fight against corruption that had surfaced in 
international business by American multinationals in the defence 
and aviation industry – the name Lockheed may ring a bell – only 
one year later, in 1977, the US enacted the so-called Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA),35 hard law by which bribery of foreign 
officials became a crime. As a complement, the act provided for an 
32  OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Recommendations for Responsible Business Conduct 
 in a Global Context, OECD Ministerial Meeting 25 May 2011, p. 29. 
 Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf; see also van Eyk 1995
33  Senden 2005, Barkhuysen & van Emmerik 2010, Calliess & Zumbansen 2011, p. 255-260
34  As an example in the People sector of CSR, the Dutch Enterprise Chamber based one of its judgments  
 on the public adoption by a multinational of the OECD Guidelines. In their successfull  appeal by the 
 employees against the multinational’s decision to close a plant in Amsterdam the court paid attention  
 to the fact that the multinational had not applied the principle of due consultation of the OECD 
 GuidelinesOK 21 juni 1979, NJ 1980, 71 (Batco, m.nt. Maeijer).  
 On this case see Timmerman 1988
35  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.
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obligation to maintain adequate records of all payments to foreign 
officials in their accounting books to enhance transparency and 
reinforce compliance.36 So from the OECD Guidelines for MNC's, 
a soft law arrangement, the substantive norm "don't bribe foreign 
officials" had migrated in the US to the hardest law possible, criminal 
law with an administrative law complement aiming at better 
governance. Full compliance with the FCPA as stipulated by the US 
Department of Justice requires that companies as principals provide 
in their agreements with agents that they shall not bribe foreign 
officials in their activities on behalf of the principal. So contract law 
also enters the regulatory landscape for bribery. This is different from 
normal contract law in the sense that it is used also as a regulatory 
tool.37 
Interestingly, substantive norms can also migrate, in whole or in part, 
from a more strict form of regulation to a less strict form or even back 
to no regulation at all, so-called deregulation. In the case of bribery 
of foreign officials as sanctioned in the FCPA this happened in 1989, 
after it had become apparent, that the FCPA put the US companies in 
a disadvantageous position towards their non-US competitors with 
respect to so-called "facilitation payments", small payments to low 
officials to make them perform their duties, such as allowing foreigners 
or imported goods to enter their country. In 1989 the FCPA was amended 
to exclude these facilitation payments from the crime of bribery, 
although facilitation payments should still be accounted for in the books 
and records.
The fight against corruption took a different direction in 1993 with the 
foundation of Transparency International by Peter Eigen, former director 
of The World Bank. TI is a so-called Global Action Network, the name 
assigned by CSR best practices pioneer Steve Waddell to a set of multiple 
public private networks in various CSR fields. Transparency International 
is a network counting today 120 country chapters.38
36  The so-called books and records and internal controls rules, monitored and enforced by the US  
 Securities and Exchange Commission.
37  Eg the difference between commercial agreements and regulatory agreements, Cafaggi 2011. This  
 form of contract is a mixture: the agency contract as such is of a commercial nature, but the required  
 compliance provisions will give them a regulatory touch.
38  See Waddell 2011 for an indepth anaysis of the origin, background and working of Global Action  
 Networks as instruments of self- or co-regulation of CSR initiatives between public and private 
 (both business and civil society) actors. See SER 2008b on International CSR for a Dutch example of a 
  Global Action Network.
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Since the US multinationals were still hampered by the FCPA obligations 
in their competition with non-US multinationals in foreign countries, 
the US government kept insisting that other countries should adopt 
similar legislation to create a level playing field. They targeted in 
particular the OECD and in 1997 the OECD Convention Combating 
Bribery39 was signed, a treaty which obliged the signatory states 
to implement FCPA type provisions in their respective criminal 
and administrative laws. Conventions or treaties like this OECD 
Convention bind the signatory states, but in principle not their people and 
companies, unless and until the states implement the agreed principles 
and rules in their national legislation.40 As a result of the implementation 
of this convention, bribery and for the most part also facilitation41 of 
foreign officials became criminal law violations in the Convention's 
signatory states. There has been still one difference in reach between 
the US and the other OECD Convention countries: the US apply their 
criminal and administrative anti-bribery provisions not only to US 
corporations operating abroad, but also to non-US corporations with 
a link to the US. That type of extraterritorial effect has not been 
adopted by the other OECD Convention states, except for the UK, 
which implemented the Convention only this year, but then in an even 
more strict and expansive way than the US.42 
This is however not the whole story on the travels of the substantive 
"no-bribery" norm through the regulatory landscape. I shall not deal 
with all regulatory international instruments which have embraced 
this substantive norm43, but from a regulatory point of view there 
are a couple of additional interesting forms that deserve mentioning. In 
1999 two Council of Europe Conventions on Corruption, one on criminal 
law and one on civil law, were signed.44 The latter one is particularly 
interesting, since it stipulates that the Council of Europe member states 
39  Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
 adopted by the Negotiating Conference on 21 November 1997 (www.oecd.org/documents).
40  It goes beyond the scope of this lecture to dwell on the different ways national jurisdictions treat 
 international law (differences between monist or dualist systems and the recognition of international  
 customary law by law or by the courts), but it is relevant in the context of CSR. See also Triggs 2006. 
41  Interestingly, the Convention left the facilitation exemption at the discretion of the member states,  
 but the majority of them decided not to exclude facilitation from the crime of bribery, so in this 
 respect the US multinationals are now in a more favourable position.
42  The increasing number of countries applying their national laws to conduct by foreign nationals  
 (including foreign corporations) outside of their territory on an extraterritorial basis causes collision  
 between these jurisdictions, which all regulate the same bribery of foreign officials. In extraterritorially 
 applied criminal law there is no such thing as an international principle of “ne bis in idem”. 
43  See for a comprehensive review of the regulation of bribery Lambooy 2010, Chapter 5. 
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shall provide in their civil legislation for compensation of damages that 
persons, both natural and legal, have sustained as a consequence of 
corruption.45 
In the last quarter of the last century new forms of international 
instruments were developed on a tripartite basis: governments or 
IGO's, NGO's and business and relevant sectors of civil society.46 
The primary examples are the Tripartite ILO Conventions of 1977. A 
tripartite initiative, in which bribery was addressed, was the UN Global 
Compact of 200047, mentioned by Sybren de Hoo already. It is a non 
binding instrument, which can be voluntarily adopted by companies 
and which in 2000 covered in nine principles the substantive CSR 
topics human rights, employment and environment. Corruption was 
later added as a tenth principle. Companies, which join the Compact, 
declare that they will improve continuously in the fields of the principles 
and publish yearly their Communication on Progress (COP). From a 
regulatory point of view this is an example of self-regulation: companies 
decide to join voluntarily, but once they have joined they are subject 
to the Compact's compliance obligations: it requires specific action 
programs on each of the 10 principles and yearly disclosure through the 
COP's. In the same vein as soft law, self-regulation may have legal effect, 
though not necessarily on the same legal basis.48  
Finally, I should mention the UN Convention Against Corruption of 
2003.49 This convention has the broadest scope both in terms of 
territorial reach since it was signed by 140 states and ratified by more 
than 107 states and in terms of substance. The convention covers both 
corruption of officials and private persons and requires the states 
to adopt the offence of bribery in their criminal law and provide for 
compensation of civil damages to persons affected by bribery.
44 Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, 4 November 1999 and Council of Europe,  
 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 27 January 1999; see in respect of the former also Civil  
 Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 174) 4 XI 1999, Council of Europe, Explanatory Report, 
 http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/174.htm
45  In her winning essay for HiiL’s 2011 law of the Future Conference Abiola Makinwa analyses the  
 efficiency of public and private regulation to combat bribery. Makinwa 2011.
46  See for an extensive overview on many subjects and in many industries, Waddell 2011.
47  UN Global Compact: www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html.
48  In his case against Nike, a Californian student-activist, Mark Kasky claimed that Nike had not complied  
 with its public statements that the production processes of their products would be free of child  
 labour. In his research, however, Kasky had found child labour in Nike’s supply chain and he claimed  
 damages in court based on unfair and deceptive practices under California’s Unfair Competition Law  
 and False Advertising Law by Nike, which the courts accepted. A long series of appeals followed and  
 the case settled on the eve of the US Supreme Court’s hearing. 
 US Supreme Court: Nike v. Kasky, 26 Jun 2003
49  UN Convention against Corruption 2003: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html.
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So since 1976, when it left the area of non-regulation and was first 
codified in the OECD Guidelines on Multinationals, the substantive 
social norm to not bribe foreign officials thus found its way in various 
types of regulation: (individual or collective) self-regulation, soft law, 
civil law, administrative law and, finally, criminal law. It travelled many 
international and national routes ending in many instances in the 
strongest form of regulation, criminal law, which by its nature is national 
state law, although the extraterritorial effect enlarges its reach beyond 
state boundaries.50
3.3 Second conclusion; CSR, a bowl of multiple regulatory forms
My second conclusion is, that a substantive social norm can leave the 
territory of non-codified social norms and migrate back and forth among 
different forms of regulation and even return to the territory of non-
codified social norms. 
The following picture of concentric circles (p. 23), ranging from uncodified 
social norms as CSR's core (or Burgmans' decent business) via self-
regulation and soft law to the different forms of hard law, show the 
dynamic field of the possible regulatory spaces for the substantive CSR 
norms: from Burgmans' decent core, literally in the centre, the norms 
may migrate and crystallize51 into a form of regulation which renders an 
increasingly more stable basis to the norm, from self-regulation and soft 
law to different forms of hard law, first to provide transparency, then to 
condition corporate behaviour and, if those means do not avoid harm 
to third parties, first adequate remedies in civil law, followed in serious 
cases also by fines and prison. 
The distinction between substance and form is therefore also relevant 
in the CSR debate as the example of bribery shows. So not only in terms 
of the substance of the CSR norms, but also in terms of the regulatory 
form into which these norms can crystallize, CSR must be considered 
a container. The anti-bribery example did shed light on the possible 
motives and processes that underlie these migration moves.
50  Kristen 2010, IBA 2008.
51  The term “crystallization” is borrowed from D. Casey and C. Scott. See their highly topical article 
 “The Crystallization of Regulatory Norms”. It was written in the context of the Transnational Law  
 and Private Actors project of the Hague Institute for the Internationalization of Law HiiL. They clarify:  
 “Crystallization is the process through which fluids are solidified, starting from a nucleus and then 
 growing in a fashion which assumes a regular pattern in a very marked contrast to the boundaries  
 from which it emerged. A process of crystallization thus gives shape to what was previously  
 shapeless, defining and giving significance to elements of the structure. Drawing on this process, our 
 particular understanding of the crystallization of norms suggests a process by which norms take on  
 regulatory effect”. Casey& Scott 2011, p. 77
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4. CSR and Law, oxymoron?  
4.1 Law and morals
Leading legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin starts the introduction, called 
"Law and Morals" to his book "Justice in Robes" with the following 
illustrative anecdote:
"When Oliver Wendell Holmes was an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court he gave the young Learned Hand a lift in his carriage as Holmes 
made his way to the court. Hand got out at his destination, waved after 
the departing carriage, and called out merrily, "Do justice, Justice!". 
Holmes stopped the cab, made the driver turn around, and rode back 
to the astonished Hand. "That's not my job!" he said, leaning out of the 
window. Then the carriage turned and departed, taking Holmes back to 
his job of allegedly not doing justice."52
In my introduction I mentioned the scholarly divide about the relation 
between law and ethics or morals. Holmes, one of the famous US 
Supreme Court justices in the beginning of the last century was a 
prominent forerunner of the American legal philosophic school of 
so-called "legal realism". Court decisions based on the facts in the 
concrete case and not legislation, let alone theories of law, are the 
most important source of law, "made by the judge on the spot". 
Similarly as in the so-called legal positivism school of thought there 
is no link between law and morals.53 Dworkin, however, has argued 
for many years that in many circumstances moral facts figure among 
the basic truth conditions of propositions of law and in his book 
critically discusses the rival claim: analytical doctrinal positivism, 
which holds that as a conceptual matter moral facts cannot figure 
among these basic truth conditions.54 CSR as set of social norms is of 
course based on justice and fairness and resonates with natural law. 
Natural law theorists take universal moral principles as basis for any 
legal system, which next to legality claims legitimacy. For legal positivists 
or legal realists, who consider morals as something "beyond law" CSR 
by definition belongs to the territory "beyond law".55 The divide 
 
52  Dworkin 2005, p. 1.
53  For legal positivism, see Hart 1961
54  Dworkin 2006, p. 225 and chapters 6 and 7.
55  "The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naïve state of mind that accepts what  
 has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by  
 all men everywhere." (Holmes 1897,p. 41). See also Teubner 2009b, dealing with the legal paradox,  
 “ justice begins where the law ends” and the question “is it lawful to apply the distinction between  
 lawful and unlawful to the world?”.
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between legal positivism and natural law with its basis in universal 
morality has been bridged in contemporaneous western democratic 
legal systems, which have adopted moral values in the form of 
fundamental rights secured by the constitution. These fundamental 
rights protect the citizens "vertically" against the state but they 
have also "horizontal effect" between the citizens, who should respect 
the fundamental rights of their fellow citizens What does this 
theoretical expose mean for CSR and law? It means that not only 
philosophically but also in practice law is important for CSR, since its social 
norms or morals may crystallize in law without losing their moral content. 
4.2 The voluntary vs. mandatory debate
So far we have reached a couple of important conclusions. First of all, 
from a substantive point of view CSR is not one single norm, but a 
container of multiple substantive norms covering a wide range of 
business activities. Second, as we saw in the context of anti bribery, 
like any social norm a substantive CSR norm can, but need not necessarily, 
crystallize into one or more of multiple forms of regulation all the 
way up to the most strict form of regulation, criminal law. And, in a 
deregulation move, it can even migrate all the way back to the domain 
of no regulation at all, as we saw with the phenomenon of facilitation 
payments and as became painfully clear in the field of financial 
regulation, which is generally considered to be the main cause of the 
financial, economic and currency crisis.56
When we combine the findings on the substance of the CSR norms 
and the different forms of regulation into which they can crystallize, it 
becomes clear that the voluntary vs. mandatory debate in fact is a non-
debate. First of all, since CSR is no single norm, there is no point in debating, 
whether CSR as such should be either voluntary or mandatory.57 That 
discussion can be held with respect to each of the substantive CSR 
norms in the container separately and in an overwhelming number 
of instances in all three Triple P-sectors that has already happened 
with the result that he social norm indeed crystallized in some form 
of regulation.58 But more importantly, the voluntary vs. mandatory
debate does not relate to the substance, but to the form, or put more 
straightforward, not to the "what", but to the "how".59
56  Reich 2009,p vii-xi, reporting on Greenspan’s hearing by US congress.
57  I herewith clearly deviate from colleague Bas Steins Bisschop, who has argued that CSR as such is a  
 legal norm, capable of being enforced in company law by certain stakeholders (Steins Bisschop 2004)
58  Eijsbouts e.a., 2010, par. 3
59  Lebano 2009; Gunningham 200860 Vranken 2006, Lokin 2007.
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Two additional arguments, one of a philosophical nature and one of a 
more practical nature, may support my claim to dismiss the view, that 
CSR-norms intrinsically are voluntary in nature and limited to the "domain 
beyond the law". The philosophical one is the fact that the substance 
of the norm does not change, if it migrates from the voluntary domain 
to one of the semi-legal or legal domains. The moral or ethical 
content of the norm stays the same. The second, more practical reason 
is the simple fact, that there is no hard and fast rule on the boundaries 
between both domains. That becomes clear when we take a closer look 
at the notion of law, both in a national and in a globalisation context. 
On the national dimension, due to the ever more complex nature of 
society and its regulation, law has developed over the last centuries 
into a complex set of principles and rules. It is no longer the clear 
and simple set of codified rules, or in the case of common law, 
precedents in the form of the courts' rulings. In order to allow for 
greater flexibility legislators have adopted the strategy to provide 
for so-called open or blanket norms, allowing the courts to take into 
account the broader principles or changing societal opinions in the 
matters before them.60 I mention the concepts of good faith, reasona-
bleness and fairness, good management, mismanagement, evidently 
improper management and societal opinions (verkeersopvattingen).61 
These open norms, which are of various different natures and ser-
ving different purposes, are relevant in the interpretation and appli-
cation of the law by the courts in the field of contract and tort law, 
corporate law, administrative law, criminal law and even international 
law. Since this interpretation is mostly contextually determined in 
each case before the courts, it is not possible to provide a hard and 
fast rule on the demarcation line between the two domains "law" on the 
one hand and "beyond law" or "non-law" on the other hand.62 Globalisation 
has further complicated this aspect. The nation state is no longer 
the main source of legal norms and the traditional combination of 
national and international law is no longer fit for purpose to regu-
late supranational or cross border relations and corporations are not (yet) 
acknowleged as subjects in international public law.63 Hence the 
development of the concept of transnational law, introduced by Philip 
Jessup in his famous lecture Transnational Law at Yale Law School in 
1956.64 For Jessup Transnational Law consists of the norms that govern 
60  Vranken 2006, Lokin 2008.
61  Rogmans 2007, Giesen 2007.
62  In his 2007 preadvice for the Dutch Association of Jurists NJV on alternative regulation Giesen analyses  
 the binding effect of alternative regulation and its role in formal law interpretation in Dutch law, par 3 & 4.
63  Nijman 2005.
64  Philip Lessup 1956.
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border-crossing transactions of both public – i.e., governmental – and 
private – i.e., individual, collective, commercial or other – actors.65 Trans- 
national law, also referred to as the new Lex Mercatoria, comprises a broad 
set of principles, norms and customs which may gain legal effect through 
both traditional legal instruments such as treaties, conventions and con-
tracts but also through codes and trade customs and practices.66 A good 
example is the privately organised internet architecture under the aegis 
of ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.67 
In their recent pioneering and highly instructive book, laying out a theory 
and methodological approach of transnational private law, Calliess and 
Zumbansen gave this approach the title Rough Consensus and Running 
Code or "RCRC", building on the concept of norm creation that was 
developed first in the context of the internet standards, a dynamic process 
of consensus building and code evolution.68 
This finding of the importance of societal opinions or social norms, 
both in national law, public international law and transnational law69, 
is of course of particular interest in the context of CSR as one of the 
institutional linking pins between society and business. It confirms 
again that there is no hard and fast rule to demarcate the boundaries 
between "law" and "non-law". 
4.3 Voluntarism; CSR, criticism on concept and on modality
Before concluding this chapter, I offer a couple of observations relating 
to the voluntary vs. mandatory debate on CSR. CSR as a concept 
has to cope with two forms of criticism. Their proponents reject 
CSR for opposite motives. The first one can be summarized by the 
Friedman doctrine already mentioned: the responsibility of business is 
to maximize its profits in the interest of its owners, the shareholders. 
Voluntary CSR is a breach of the fiduciary duties of management vis a 
vis their shareholders. Mandatory CSR a fortiori is out of the question. 
To summarize this view: "CSR is sacrificing profits in the social interest", 
the most succinct disqualifier for CSR I found.70 
65  Calliess & Zumbansen 2010, Ch 1, p. 11-26.
66  Lambooy, Raic, Krycka 2009.
67  ICANN was formed in 1998. It is a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with participants from  
 all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable. It promotes  
 competition and develops policy on the Internet’s unique identifiers.
68  Calliess & Zumbansen 2010, p. 24, also Glinski 2007.
69  Calliess & Zumbansen 2010, p. 248-255 on Law and Social Norms. 
70 Elhauge 2005, cited in Reinhardt 2008, p. iii. The definition suggests a plain rejection of CSR, but that  
 would be jumping to conclusions as Reinhardt and colleagues explain in their article, in which they  
 take this definition as starting point in their analysis of CSR through an economic lens.
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At the other end of the spectrum we find the critics who reject CSR, 
either altogether because of its conceived voluntary and therefore 
counterproductive nature or, acknowledging the pluriform nature, 
simply in its voluntary fashion. One of the most vocal and influential 
current academic thinkers representing the former side is Robert Reich. 
In his seminal book under the suggestive title Supercapitalism71 he 
refers to CSR as an earnest and sincere movement and acknowledges 
that some of the practices, such as corporate codes of conduct may 
have a positive impact, "but almost all has occurred outside of the 
democratic process. Almost none has changed the rules of the game. 
To view it as a new form of democratic capitalism is to fail to 
understand the logic of supercapitalism. It is also to divert attention 
from the more difficult but more important job of establishing new 
rules that protect and advance the common good, and keep 
supercapitalism from overwhelming politics." Reich contends that 
business' mission, in line with Friedman's doctrine, is to maximise 
profits and that "corporate executives are not authorized by anyone –
least of all by their consumers or investors – to balance profits against 
the public good. Nor do they have any expertise in making such moral 
calculations. That's why we live in a democracy, in which government 
is supposed to represent the public in drawing such lines".72 Therefore, 
in view of its proclaimed voluntarism Reich dismisses CSR altogether. 
Unless democratically established regulation forces business to act 
in socially responsible ways thereby creating the level playing field 
for all, demands from customers for the lowest prices and investors 
for the highest returns will result in fierce competition and "a race 
to the bottom". Reich's views that only mandatory rules will do the 
job are for the most part shared by NGO's active in the field of CSR, 
who, however other than Reich, do not dismiss CSR as a concept, but 
insist on its mandatory fashion. As I have argued, CSR is not one single 
norm and it is composed of a wide range of social norms, a number 
of which, though not all, can crystallize in one or more forms of 
regulation and, as I have shown, indeed many have done so already. 
The question would be, how Reich would view CSR if it were no longer 
characterized as purely voluntary, but as a regulatory mix as I have 
done today. Another comment I would like to make, relates to Reich's 
claim for supremacy of democracy. It concerns the lack of global 
democracy. His analysis stops at the US borders and does not provide 
the solution to regulate foreign multinational companies, although 
71 Reich 2008,p. 168-169.
72  Reich 2009, p. 197.
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quite a few US CSR related laws and regulations with extra territorial 
effect may impact seriously non-US multinationals under US democratic 
principles.73 Another interesting aspect, although not for today.
4.3 Third conclusion: CSR neither voluntary nor mandatory, but both
My third conclusion can be brief: both claims, for voluntarism and for 
mandatory CSR, relate to form and not to substance and are ideologically 
driven. As Sybren de Hoo has already amply argued for practical reasons, 
the paradigm on voluntarism should change. This characterization is no 
longer fit for purpose. The real discussion should be, whether and, if so, 
into what form of regulation each of the substantive CSR norms could 
crystallize best to achieve the result needed at the particular time and 
place for the specific norm.
73  I mentioned already the US FCPA. Other examples are the US Antitrust and Securities legislation (for  
 the latter in particular the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 and the Dodd Frank Act 2010) and the Alien Torts  
 Statute of 1789. I shall refer to these later in my lecture.
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74  See EU Conference Report , mentioned in note 12, 
 Chapter 1, second page, under CSR research in practice.
75  Lebano 2009.
76  ISO, the International Organization for Standardization, has launched an International Standard  
 providing guidelines for social responsibility (SR) named ISO 26000 or simply ISO SR and was 
 released on 1 November 2010.
5. CSR, concept, practice and foundational theory:  
 the licence to operate
5.1 Distinguishing norm and practice.
Having explored the substantive nature of the CSR norms and the 
different forms into which they can crystallize and moreover having 
dismissed the claimed voluntary nature of CSR, I would now submit that 
there is a reason and indeed need, not only first, to distinguish between 
two dimensions in the concept of CSR: a normative dimension and an 
operational or process dimension to put the norms in practice, but also, 
second, to structurally link the two. Why is this important? Not only does 
it put Sybren de Hoo's lecture and mine in perspective, but as the report 
on the EU CSR Conference of 2010 confirms, there is "a very big gap 
between the goals of the European Commission (which saw CSR as a 
vital link between innovation and competitiveness on the one hand and 
social inclusion on the other) and, with a few exceptions, the perceptions 
of scientific CSR academics". In respect of CSR research, the report finds 
that there are a number of weaknesses, such as fragmentation and 
lack of collaboration with little integration of theoretical and applied 
work and low interdisciplinarity.74 I would assume that this is one of 
the reasons, why there are many different definitions of CSR in the 
first place, which represent the many views prevailing, and that these 
definitions mix the foundational and philosophical normative views 
on the nature of CSR with the ideologically framed practical views on 
how to arrive at the desired results in practice.75 This is reflected in the 
list of core characteristics of CSR which I mentioned earlier and in the 
most recent CSR definition, that of the ISO 26000 Guideline.76 The clear 
normative characteristics are the ones that relate to the substance of 
CSR: internalisation or management of externalities, multistakeholder 
orientation and alignment of social, environmental and economic 
responsibilities. The operational characteristics are related to how to 
best comply with the normative requirements such as voluntarism, or 
not, and the extension to philanthropy. A special word is needed on 
the characteristic: mix of practices and values. "CSR is clearly about a 
particular set of business practices and strategies that deal with social 
issues, but for many people it is also something more than that - namely 
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77  Crane, Matten and Spence 2008, p. 8.
78  Eijsbouts 2005, p.77. This also resonates with the findings on the need felt by CSR managers for a  
 workable definition of CSR in practice. De Hoo 2010 e.a. 
79  Eijsbouts e.a. 2010.
80  Note that I am speaking here about “firm” rather than “company”, to reflect that the norms are  
 directed at each form of business organisation, whether or not it is conducted in a legal form. 
81  See Sjåfjell 2010 on internalizing externalities.
a philosophy or set of values that underpin these practices...... The values' 
dimension of CSR is part of the reason why the subject raises so much 
disagreement - if it were just about what companies did in the social 
arena, it would not cause so much controversy as the debate about why 
they do it."77 
5.2 Two descriptions, CSR as normative notion and in operation
This shows in my opinion, why there is a need to separate the notion 
of "what" or in this context better even "how" from the notion "why". 
"Why" refers to the normative aspect, "how" refers to the process. This 
was exactly my reason to propose the following two descriptions in 
my internal company practice.78 With some further refinement, since I 
developed these two descriptions some seven years ago79, I provide the 
current versions. 
My normative description reads: "CSR is the responsibility of corporations 
to meet the legitimate expectations of society for the firm80 to conduct 
its businesses in ways that produce economic, social and ecological 
benefits to relevant stakeholders and society at large".
The normative characteristics: multiple stakeholder orientation, 
alignment of social and economic responsibilities and internalisation or 
management of externalities81 are clearly included around Burgmans' 
central claim of society's perception on the decency of business 
management, reflected in legitimate expectations. As we already 
concluded, some of these expectations are embodied in hard laws, to be 
enforced by the courts of law, others in "soft laws", self-regulation or in 
general unwritten ethical values, to be enforced either by the courts of 
law (e.g. in interpreting open legal norms) or the courts of public opinion. 
My operational or process description reads: "CSR as a process is the 
structured and systematic approach by which firms are embedding 
all aspects of the applicable CSR- norms in their daily operations at all 
relevant levels, monitoring compliance and results and reporting to 
relevant stakeholders and society at large".
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Key elements here are identification of the applicable substantive 
norms, awareness and embedding, measurement, transparency 
and accountability. This resonates with the definition provided by 
Elkington as referenced by Dommerholt and mentioned by Sybren de 
Hoo in his lecture: Corporate Sustainability Performance.82 
5.3 Bridging the gap between academia and practice
My submission is that the two definitions, CSR and CSP, can function as 
the two bridgeheads that will allow us to bridge the gap between the 
academic research and the practice in the field of CSR.83 To illustrate this 
claim I invite you to join me on a brief excursion to the different fields 
of scholarship and philosophy, which each have explored the various 
aspects of CSR from their point of view, aimed in all modesty of course 
at "a theory of CSR" through a legal lens.
However, before starting this excursion, there is an important caveat 
to be made. It draws on the origins of the notion of CSR. How surprising 
this may sound to you, CSR is basically a US corporate law and 
governance issue. The acronym CSR allows us to grasp the roots of its 
notion: Corporate Social Responsibility is about the responsibility of 
corporations towards society. This goes to the heart of corporate law: 
what is a corporation in law and what responsibilities does it owe 
and to whom, if any? We shall deal with that important question 
later in detail, but here I shall limit myself to the finding, that this 
US debate focuses on the highly contested view whether corporate 
boards should aim at maximising shareholder value84 or have 
discretionary power or even legal duties to allocate corporate assets 
to the benefit of other stakeholders. Not only much later, after 
World War II,but conceptually more important also quite different 
from the US CSR debate has been the development of the notion CSR 
in Europe. On our continent CSR relates to business and society in 
general, regardless of the legal form in which the business operations 
are conducted. See for instance the Dutch acronym MVO or 
Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen, in which the legal form 
does not figure at all. The emphasis is on the way business is actually 
conducted by any entrepreneur, whether a single operator, a 
partnership or a company, so not exclusively on the responsibilities of 
82  De Hoo 2011, p. 15. See also Dommerholt 2009, Melé 2008, p. 49-55 and Orlitzky 2008, p.113-134.
83 Cf Van Oosterhout & Heugens 2008, who point to the importance of the need to link the   
 operationalization of CSR and the theoretical definitions of CSR (p. 204). 
84  Friedman 1970.
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a corporation as a legal entity towards society. Although the latter is 
an important issue per se as we shall see later, it unduly narrows the 
focus of CSR in the context of my observations.  
When we consider the different CSR theories, it is important to keep this 
conceptual distinction of "business" as an activity versus "corporation" 
as a legal entity in mind. In a very concise and highly instructive article 
Prof. Domenec Melé of IESI Business School in Barcelona classified the 
different CSR approaches and philosophies under the following four 
main headings: 
-  Corporate Social Performance, a theory grounded in sociology;
-  Shareholder Value Theory or Fiduciary Capitalism, 
 a particular economic theory;
-  Stakeholder Theory, which in its normative version is based on 
 ethical perspectives85 and, 
-  Corporate Citizenship, rooted on political studies.86
As you will see there is no legal approach or philosophy mentioned 
or included, although the last three categories relate to certain 
aspects of the primary legal form in which business is conducted, the 
corporation. Only the first theory, Corporate Social Performance or CSP, 
is conceptually legal form neutral. I quote Melé: "In order to determine 
specific responsibilities, many authors insist on the importance of 
paying attention to social expectations regarding the firm's 
performance and concern for social needs. Among other arguments 
for assuming CSR, it is stressed that business has power and power 
requires responsibility. It is also emphasized that society gives business 
licence to operate and, consequently, business must serve society 
not only by creating wealth, but also by contributing to social needs 
and satisfying social expectations towards business."87 
85  The term stakeholder was introduced by Freeman in 1984 (Freeman 1984); Donaldson and Preston 1995  
 distinguish three modes of stakeholder theory: descriptive, instrumental and, lastly, normative. They  
 note that a shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder model requires a normative justification and point  
 to Freeman and Evan’s recommendation that a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” will be applied in order to  
 render the stakeholder bargains “fair”. See for this reasoning Crane, Matten & Spence 2008, p. 154-155.    
86  Melé 2008.
87  Melé 2008, p. 49.
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5.4 CSR through the legal lens, corporate citizenship and the licence to 
operate
How then should we look at CSR through a legal lens? As lawyers being 
quite familiar with this concept I submit that the best starting point 
for our endeavour is the concept of the licence to operate, in this case 
the metaphoric licence extended by society to business within the 
realm of the latter's corporate citizenship, another metaphor familiar 
to lawyers. Like ordinary citizens corporations are bestowed by society 
with citizen rights, albeit with the limitations necessarily following 
from their status as legal persons, but as the rights of natural citizens 
come with responsibilities88, likewise the rights of corporate citizens are 
conditioned by responsibilities. These responsibilities are not necessarily 
legal responsibilities as we have seen in the case of Ruggie's corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. Rousseau's social contract theory, 
as revived by John Rawls89 and by Amartya Sen90, may serve as the 
political-philosophical basis of corporate citizenship.91 The idea of the 
corporate social contract was developed by Business Ethics scholar 
Thomas Donaldson: business receives from society a number of privileges, 
mainly in conjunction with the institutionalised legal personality, such 
as limited liability for shareholders and managers, in exchange for which 
society receives certain benefits from business. Society agrees to this 
exchange as long as these benefits exceed the costs for society.92 The 
idea of a global social contract including the business sector is also 
the basis for the Earth Charter, a code developed by influential world 
leaders and prominent political and philosophic thinkers in the nineties 
aimed at a model for, in my words, Triple P inclusive global governance. 
It is based on a tripartite understanding of governments, business and 
civil society.93 As a corollary of the corporate social contract, business is 
granted by society its licence to operate. This licence consists of several 
sublicences. Best known to us as lawyers is of course the legal licence to 
operate, extended pursuant to law by competent authorities, to engage 
88  Hirsch Ballin 2011.
89  The political theory based corporate citizenship conception reflecting the licence to operate reminds  
 us of the social contract theories, which in Rawls’ modern version is built in the presumption of justice  
 as fairness.
90  Sen 2009, p. 361-364 on human rights.
91   See for a well-elaborated outline of the theory of corporate citizenship R. Jeurissen 2002, Interestingly, 
in academic literature there is also mention of corporate citizenship as conceptually equivalent yet 
rhetorically superior synonym of CSP (Orlitzky 2008, p 116). In my vision as laid out in this lecture 
corporate citizenship is the political philosophical basis for the normative concept of CSR while CSP is 
the corollary to CSR for its practical implementation. 
92  Donaldson 1982. See also de Hoo 2011, p. 11, referring to the principle of reciprocity, also a corporate  
 social contracts based approach.
93  Lubbers, van Genugten & Lambooy 2008. 
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in certain business activities or perform certain business functions 
subject to legal conditions, monitored and enforced by the courts of law 
and/or other legally competent authorities. As we have seen, however, 
in view of the development and significance of alternative forms of 
regulation (often referred to as mechanisms "in the shadow of the law") 
it will be more appropriate to refer nowadays to the regulatory licence 
to operate. Next to this regulatory sublicense, however, traditionally 
there is an important second sublicense, the social licence to operate. 
This is the domain of those legitimate expectations of society that 
have not (yet) crystallized into law or any other manner of regulation. 
Monitoring and enforcement of this licence is entrusted to the courts 
of public opinion, whether or not called to attention by activist NGO's, 
and, as we have seen for instance in the case of Shell's plans to sink 
the Brent Spar in the Atlantic, these courts, called to duty in this case 
by Greenpeace, can be highly effective. Companies that have 
experienced enforcement by the courts of public opinion know 
their powers. Quite often do they extend in reach and effect 
considerably beyond the powers of the legal courts.94 Gunningham, 
writing on Corporate Environmental Responsibility95, eloquently 
explains why in his opinion the licence to operate concept captures 
the complexity of the relationship between the regulated enterprise 
and key stakeholders well. He provides three perspectives.
First, the concept of a licence encapsulates the extent to which 
various stakeholders can bestow or withdraw privileges from a 
company in a direct relationship. Second, the relationship between 
companies and the stakeholders is an interactive one with many of 
the terms open to negotiation with the possible effect that the social 
licence, voluntarily or imposed, will crystallize into one of the forms 
of regulatory licence. Third, the notion of an overall licence encompasses 
Gunningham's empirical observation that there is indeed considerable 
interaction among its components, the regulatory and the social licence, 
to which he adds a third sublicense, the economic licence.96 I shall 
leave this latter for the moment. Gunningham mentions also a fourth 
sublicense, the collective licence to operate. Systematically, this is 
94  As e.g. Shell and Walmart have experienced boycotts by the customers of their poducts as reactions to their  
 policies (environmental in the case of Shell’s intended disposal of the Brent Spar and Walmart in the case of  
 alleged discrimination in employment practices). These boycotts were sparked by NGO actions. 
95  Gunningham 2007.
96  This latter licence reminds us of Archie Carroll’s pyramid of corporate responsibilities, the first and  
 basic one of which is the economic responsibility: a reasonable rate of return as foundation upon  
 which all other responsibilities, the legal responsibility, the social responsibility and the discretionary  
 or philanthropic responsibility rest. I shall revert to this when we shall deal with the future of  
 corporate law. See also de Hoo 2011, p. 21.
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a variance of the individual social sublicense extended to a whole 
industry by society to the sector concerned based on certain collective 
self-regulation measures adopted by that sector. The extractive industry 
and the chemical industry are cases in point: both industries have 
developed important self-regulatory instruments based on societal 
pressure, such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
to disclose the payments by the industry to governments or the 
Responsible Care program of the Chemical Industry, adopted in the 
aftermath of the Bhopal disaster in 1984.  
My intention was to show, how the mainly academic normative 
and the practical operational notions of CSR could be reconciled. 
The linked concepts of corporate citizenship and licence to operate on 
the one hand and the corporate social performance concept on the 
other hand nicely bridge the divide. 
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6. Reinforcing the licence to operate by changing  
 the paradigms in company law
6.1 CSR and regulation, form following function
Having analysed the phenomenon of CSR through a legal lens, I must 
now address the main task I have set myself to deliver on the promise 
by colleague Sybren de Hoo, namely to provide you with thoughts 
about regulatory options to reinforce the licence to operate, which, as 
he concluded, is badly needed.97 And, as I have already mentioned, he is 
in the good company of such influential thought leaders as Cadbury, 
Reich, Stiglitz, Lord Wedderburn and many others as I already mentioned 
or will do in this lecture.
A closer look at the CSR debate shows interesting and important 
legal questions indeed. Which substantive norms in the Triple P scope 
need regulatory intervention and, if so, what type of regulation? Can it 
be left to business to regulate itself or is soft law or even hard law 
needed to protect the interests of society or individuals? Should 
transparency of operations be arranged on the basis of mandatory 
reporting? And how should universal fundamental norms be protected, 
now that the nation state is still the prevailing authority to shape 
and enforce law, but at the same time multinational companies are 
organized and active in many jurisdictions without a global government 
system?98 How does CSR impact on corporate decision-making and 
what rights do the various stakeholders in companies have to 
influence or challenge corporate decisions? What is the role of 
business in the field of human rights: to protect or to respect and 
how do these concepts differ? What responsibility does business have 
to assure that human rights are respected in their supply chains?99 
What remedies are available in case business is not living up to societal 
expectations or to legal obligations impacting on the rights or interests 
of third parties? Are parent companies responsible and liable for the 
actions of their subsidiaries abroad and on what substantive law 
basis, that of the home country or the host country?
97  de Hoo 2011, Par 5.
98  Stiglitz 2006.
99  The Draft UN Norms 2003 recommended that business was equally responsible for the realisation and  
 protection for human rights as states are. As I have set out earlier this recommendation was not   
 adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee (now UN Human Rights Council) and it recommended the  
 appointment of a special representative of the UN Secretary General on the issue of business and human  
 rights. Prof John Ruggie was appointed and the rest is history: states have the duty to protect and business  
 has the corporate responsibility to respect. See also Kinley,Nolan & Zerial 2007 and Eijsbouts 2009.
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The story of the regulatory travels of the substantive anti-bribery 
norm has already provided us with a wide range of options of 
regulatory mechanisms including hard law in all forms, administrative 
policies and decisions, soft law, and self-regulation, in collective or 
individual form. Together with the CSR substantive norms, which are 
uncodified or unwritten, these norms crystallized in any one or more 
of these regulatory forms are the constituent parts of the licence to 
operate granted by society to business as we have seen earlier. I note, 
by the way, that self-regulation in its collective or individual forms 
is often the result of public government pressure in the form of 
threatened regulation, if no action is taken by business itself.100
With respect to the objectives of all these forms of regulation, the first 
distinction to be made from a CSR point of view is that between:
(a)  those laws and forms of regulation (individual and collective 
  self-regulation included) which encourage or stipulate the right 
  business conduct;
(b)  those laws and regulations (or possibly also contractual 
  arrangements) which provide remedies for third parties harmed by 
  improper business conduct, and
(c)  those laws and forms of regulation, which impose administrative 
  fines or criminal sanctions on violations of the CSR laws and 
  regulations. 
You will remember the concentric circles I showed you earlier. Category 
(c) is by definition hard law or based on hard law. Category (b) is 
mainly public tort law, unless contracts made in the supply chain 
provide stipulations for the benefit of third parties, who are entitled 
under the relevant contractual provisions to a direct cause of action 
( jus quaesitum tertio, derdenbeding). Although adequate remedies in case 
of harm are certainly important and pose difficult legal questions in case 
the harm occurs abroad, directly or through subsidiary companies, from 
the perspective of the desired outcomes, decent and responsible business 
conduct is our primary goal. Therefore, I shall concentrate on category (a) 
and leave categories (b) and (c) aside, at least for the moment.
The next preliminary observation is that regulation can either be Triple 
P sector specific, such as the laws preventing water, air or soil pollution 
in the Planet sector, or cover a range of CSR topics, such as the OECD 
100 Peer pressure or civil societal criticism can also lead to “imposed” forms of self-regulation.
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Guidelines or the UN Global Compact, or be of a general nature like 
corporate, contract, tort or criminal law. 
The most pertinent example of the latter category is corporate law, 
which regulates the management and supervision of corporations, 
including the reporting on its activities. Through the application of 
CSR substantive norms in the interpretation of open or blanket norms 
relating to the way management and supervision should conduct 
the business in a responsible way, CSR norms may become legally 
relevant for the company and possibly also for its directors and 
officers collectively or individually. The relevant cultural orientation 
(shareholder or stakeholder focused) and the legal architecture 
of the particular national company law system (for listed companies 
accompanied by securities laws and regulation) as the central 
regulatory complex within a wider corporate governance context 
will answer the question of, whether and to what extent specific 
CSR norms will be taken into account by the courts, if the management 
and supervision policies, decisions and practices are challenged. 
Legal concepts such as fiduciary duties, duties of care, good faith, 
adequate management, gross or simple mismanagement are all 
possible entrances for CSR norms to play a role in the courts' 
judgments.101 The Dutch company law system provides, in addition, 
for a so far unique system for relevant stakeholders to request an 
order by the Enterprise Chamber for an official inquiry by experts 
into the management practices. If the findings will lead to the 
assessment by the court of actual mismanagement, the court has 
far reaching powers to intervene. These include even such drastic 
measures as the annulment of management decisions, the appointment 
of interim managing and/or supervisory directors and amendment 
of the articles of association. Colleague Bas Steins Bisschop 
deserves praise as the first legal scholar in the Netherlands to have 
explored already in 2000 in his inaugural lecture at Nyenrode 
University the possible relation between CSR and company law.
Since this is also the main research field of our Institute of Corporate Law, 
Governance and Innovation Policies, launched today, I shall concentrate 
on the company law and governance regulation of corporations, in 
view of our Globalisation focus with a particular lens on multinational 
101  For an analysis of the possible interaction of CSR-norms and Dutch corporate law, see Steins Bisschop  
 2004 and Eijsbouts 2010. We are divided on the question whether CSR as such is a relevant legal notion, 
 which is argued by Steins Bisschop. I take the view that the container nature of CSR, being a collection  
 of pluriform substantive norms, cannot serve as such as a relevant legal notion similarly as the notion  
 corporate governance which also contains many norms and like CSR in many forms.   
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corporations and address three themes: the nature of the corporation as 
such, the nature of corporate groups and, finally, the liability of corporate 
groups in CSR cases.102 But allow me to provide you first with some 
introductory comments.
6.2 Players, rules and tools; an anatomic lesson 
In order to show the players of the game, its rules and the tools to be 
deployed by each of them, I developed in 2004 the following schematic 
overview of its legal anatomy, which has proven quite useful:103 
At first sight this scheme looks more complex than it is in reality. You 
see three vertical columns: the players in the middle, the rules on the 
left and the tools on the right. Management and supervision of course 
take the pivotal position in the game. From their perspective there is 
an internal management and organisational dimension, which you 
will find on the lower half of the scheme with the business managers 
and the employees, and an accountability or external dimension on 
the upper half with the stakeholders. Both dimensions have of course 
their specific set of rules in accordance with the rights and obligations 
102  I note that most substantive CSR norms and forms of CSR regulation address also businesses  
 conducted either in a non-incorporated way or in a different type of legal form, but this type of  
 regulation is mostly Triple P-sector oriented and therefore covers many types of business activities,  
 discussion of which goes considerably beyond the scope of my lecture.   
103  One of my outside counsels advised me even to obtain copyright, but it remains freely available!
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of the players in those dimensions. On the rules side you will see the 
smart regulatory mix of norms. The traditional governance regulatory 
mix is located on the upper half of the left column and the CSR or 
Triple P regulatory mix which governs the actual business operations 
is mainly located on the lower half of the left column. Relations with 
personnel, possible impact on third party human rights, environmental 
and fair play regulations, such as competition laws and anti-bribery 
laws and accounting rules, are to be found in this lower part of the 
left column. Increasingly important, both in corporate governance 
and a CSR context, are the tools for adequate management in the 
lower half of the right column. The right strategy with a sustainable 
business model comes first, complemented with a values based 
culture, followed by the right organisation and policies including risk 
and conflict management and internal monitoring and controls. 
In the upper half of the right column you will find the regular 
and ad hoc communication patterns for transparency, accountability 
and dialogue with shareholders and other relevant stakeholders. Also 
intervention possibilities for shareholders and other stakeholders to 
question and, if necessary, challenge management policies and decisions 
in court and for authorities to investigate and possibly prosecute the 
company and/or its directors and officers are to be found here.
6.3 Corporate governance and CSR intertwined
Having sketched for you the playing field for the various players in the 
corporate governance and CSR field, I now turn to the relation between 
both these frameworks. This is a theme with progressing insight. The 
classical view was that both have different dimensions. Corporate 
governance merely related to the primary players in the corporate field: 
management, supervision and shareholders, while CSR had an external 
focus: stakeholders and wider society.104 Their interdependence became 
however quickly clear and the more progressive view, as also voiced by 
colleague Sybren de Hoo in his lecture105, is that corporate governance is 
next to the three P's the fourth substantive subject of CSR.106 Walsh and 
Lowry also share the vision that CSR encompasses corporate governance: 
" ...Corporate governance is an increasingly important aspect of CSR. 
And, as they continue to develop, corporate governance principles will 
104  Slagter 2005, p. 135 and Lambooy 2010, chapter 2.
105  de Hoo 2011, following Dommerholt 2009.
106 Following Dommerholt he even added it as a fourth CSR driver to the Triple P. My submission would be  
 that governance in this sense belongs to the process rather than to the substantive aspect of CSR.
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continue to provide the more solid foundations on which broader CSR 
principles - and business ethics - can be further enhanced."107
The most recent view, however, is that the corporate governance concept, 
of course in an extended way, should encompass CSR. The number of 
scholars representing this view is steadily increasing. There are ample 
arguments to support this view. These are partly of an empirical, partly 
of a descriptive and partly of a normative nature. Empirical support 
comes from the drafters of the US Sarbanes Oxley Act 2001, the 
response to the corporate scandals at Enron, Tyco and WorldCom, which 
mandated the SEC to adopt stronger corporate governance 
requirements for listed companies. Following this mandate the 
SEC instructed the US Stock Exchanges to require listed companies 
to adopt, monitor and enforce a code of conduct, typically encom- 
passing the usual CSR topics.108 The motives were of course 
protection of the company's reputation and thereby securing 
shareholder value. The sanction was drastic, as could be expected 
from the US securities regulator: delisting! Additional empirical 
support can be found in the OECD Corporate Governance Principles 
2004, which in their introductory remarks characterized the remit of 
corporate governance as:
"Maximising value subject to meeting the corporation's financial, legal 
and other obligations. This inclusive definition stresses the need for 
board of directors to balance the interests of shareholders with those 
of other stakeholders - employees, customers, suppliers, investors, 
communities - in order to achieve long term sustained value." 
The Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2009, the revised version of 
its predecessor 2004 Code which already provided for the need to 
establish a code of conduct, adopted CSR in principle II.1. as one of the 
core responsibilities of management. Management is accountable on 
this new task to the Supervisory Board and the General Meeting of 
Shareholders. In the tradition of the European corporate governance 
codes the "comply or explain" rule applies, but according to the drafters 
of the Dutch Code, this rule only applies to the Code's best practices, not 
to its principles.109 That being so, I submit it would have been anyway 
an impossible task for management to explain, that it would not accept 
this new responsibility. 
107  Walsh & Lowry 2005, in Mullerat 2005, p. 38.
108  See the corporate governane requirements of NYSE and Nasdaq.
109  De Monchy & Legein 2009.
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As I said, many authoritative scholars and business leaders represent this 
latest view on the extended scope of corporate governance.110 Among 
them not least Sir Adrian Cadbury, European Corporate Governance 
patriarch, chairman of the UK Committee to draft the first national 
Corporate Governance Code in Europe and inventor of the "comply or 
explain" formula, who wrote in 2000: 
"Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. 
The governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of 
resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of 
those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society."111
It could be argued that these comments are not necessarily relevant, 
since corporate governance is formally only directed to listed companies. 
There is, however, a counter argument: many non-listed companies 
and organisations, including those not for profit, have embraced 
the corporate governance principles to the extent applicable. It was 
therefore not surprising, that the EU in its 2011 green paper on corporate 
governance112 requested views on whether or not corporate governance 
should be made formally applicable also to non-listed companies. 
The reason why I have expanded on the inclusion of CSR in corporate 
governance is the fact, that corporate governance since its introduction 
in the early nineties of the last century is becoming the most important 
integral normative framework for the management and supervision of 
listed, and increasingly also non-listed companies. As we have seen the 
regulatory anatomy of corporate governance is similar to that of CSR, but 
there is an additional reason for this proposition. As recent issues have 
shown, quite a few problems in corporate land are both governance and 
CSR related. I mention the increasingly uneasiness of investors and the 
general public about executive pay. In the still highly relevant 1976 RIO 
110  Eg Clarke 2007, chapter 8, Kerr, Landa & Pitts 2009, p. 21. See also Zumbansen 2009. Bob Tricker provides   
 a brief history of the evolution of corporate governance ,: “The original corporate governance codes,   
 dating from the early 1990s, were voluntary. At the time they were derided by some company chairmen   
 as being no more that expensive, box ticking exercises. But since then three significant changes have   
 taken place. Firstly, corporate governance compliance has increasingly become  mandatory, enshrined   
 in regulation or in some cases law. Complaints now tend to be about the cost of compliance not about   
 the need of corporate governance codes. Secondly, risk analysis and risk management have become an  
 integral part of the coprorate governance process. Thirdly and most recently, corporate social responsibility 
 and sustainability have been added to the corporate goverance portfolio.” Tricker 2009, p. 349,
111  A. Cadbury, foreword in World Bank, Corporate Governance, a Framework for Implementation, Washington 2000,  
 cited in Clarke 2007.
112  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GREEN PAPER, The EU corporate governance framework Brussels, 
 5.4.2011 COM(2011) 164 final.
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report113 to the Club of Rome, prepared under the coordination of Nobel 
laureate Jan Tinbergen, the income relation found between the rich and 
the poor was 13:1. Tinbergen would like to decrease this within 40 years 
to 3:1. What we see nowadays, however, 35 years later, is that the relation 
in income between the US CEO and the average (not even lowest, sic) US 
employee often is much more than 13:1. In 2009 the latter relationship 
was 263:1.114 This would seem unsustainable and this problem is 
both governance as well as CSR related. In the US this has caused the 
introduction of so-called "say on pay" rules, by which shareholders can 
influence or even control executive pay. 
As already mentioned the well-known governance problems at ENRON, 
Tyco, Worldcom, Ahold and Parmalat in the beginning of the last 
decade prompted intensified corporate governance regulation, but it 
is clear, that many of the problems could have been labelled as CSR 
problems as well. Trust, with the primary and secondary stakeholders, is 
a central notion in both corporate goverenance and CSR.
6.4 Smart regulatory policies: nudge, meta-regulation, and transparency 
What is smart government policy in this regard? The first comment 
to be made is that law and regulation have their limitations and 
are certainly not always the best way to regulate behaviour.115 Well-
known Chicago Professors Richard Thaler and Cas Sunstein developed 
their libertarian-paternalistic policy of Nudge116, soft pushes by 
government or regulators, but unnoticed as such by the public, into the 
direction of the decisions by the public that the government deems 
best for the public. These nudges should be realised by a smart choice 
architecture. There are simple examples such as placing the products 
in a certain way in the supermarket in order to let the customers making 
healthier choices, but there are also rather complicated examples, e.g. in 
the Planet-field the very successful emission trading system for the control 
of acid deposition ('acid rain'), introduced as an amendment in 1990 to 
the US Clean Air Act. As compared with a command-and-control system, 
the traditional way of governmental regulation, the trading mechanism 
is estimated to have saved $ 357 million annually in its first five years.117 
113  RIO stands for Reshaping the International Order; the The RIO Report was prepared for the Club of Rome  
 in 1976 by a committee formed and coordinated at the request of Dr Aurelio Pecci, the Chaiman of the  
 Club’s Executive Committee, by Prof Jan Tinbergen. The report was issued in book form by Elesvier  
 Amsterdam in 1976 and contains the reports by subcommittees of international experts in their field. 
114  Research by US Institute for Policy Studies, referenced in De Volkskrant, 1 September 2011.
115  E.g. Munneke 2008, Westerman & Mackor 2008, Raaijmakers 2005.
116  Thaler & Sunstein 2009.
117  Thaler & Sunstein 2009, 199.
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Although certainly not unimportant, ample doubt is justified whether 
merely pursuing this policy in the regulation of business would restore the 
confidence of the public in the system.   
The government pressure can take the form of making government 
assistance conditional upon the voluntary adoption of non-binding 
instruments or codes. Ruggie's smart mix includes for instance the 
suggestion to only grant export credits or export insurance if the 
beneficiary has pledged to live up to the OECD guidelines, which in their 
updated 2011 version include the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights in a new chapter specifically drafted for this purpose. 
Ruggie's extension of the corporate responsibility to the supply chain 
adds the use of contract law to the mix, the so-called "contractualization 
of human rights".118 So by the adoption of Ruggie's Framework by the 
OECD in its 2011 version of the Guidelines for Multinationals, Ruggie's 
non-legal universal baseline expectation has become soft law, and this 
with a hardening effect in the form of a more strict National Contact 
Point (NCP) procedure to deal with complaints of non-compliance 
with the Guidelines. An example, where the UK NCP used Ruggie's 
due diligence approach in the supply chain even before the update of 
the Guidelines, was the Afrimex case.119 This could point to a future 
acceptance of Ruggie's Framework as international customary law.
In connection with CSR and smart regulation another legislative 
technique should be mentioned, that of so-called meta-regulation.120 
The concept of meta-regulation reflects the idea, that it is possible to 
regulate behaviour without doing so directly.121 It implies that direct 
intervention and enforcement are replaced with "allegedly lighter 
demands on economic actors to institutionalize processes of self-
regulation".122 Meta-regulation strategies in this sense are contingent 
on the relevant substantive area of regulation; for instance, in the 
context of the regulation of competition, meta-regulation might mean 
governmental monitoring of organizations own competition compliance 
programmes.123 An example of this type of regulation are the US Federal 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines124, which provide for norms for 
courts and prosecutors to sanction violations by companies of criminal 
118  McBarnet &Kurkchyan 2007.
119  See for an interesting analysis of the semi-legal nature of the OECD NCP-procedure Catá Backer 2009.
120  Parker 2007.
121  Bomhoff & Meuwese 2011, p. 141. 
122  Jordana & Levi-Faur 2004, 6-7, quoted by Bomhoff & Meuwese 2011, p. 141.
123  Bomhoff & Meuwese 2011, p 141-142.
124 The US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Compliance Program Requirements 
 http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_HTML/8b2_1.htm.
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laws, such as the antitrust laws and the anti-bribery laws. Effective 
compliance programs, of which the main features are described in 
the Guidelines, are taken into account positively in the imposition of 
fines and jail sentences. These guidelines, therefore, are an example 
of inducement of companies to adequate self-regulation in the fields 
of substantive legislation.125  Or as Parker clarifies: "Law attempts to 
constitute corporate "consciences" – getting companies to want to do 
what they should do – not just legally compliant outputs or actions... 
Meta-regulation – the proliferation of different forms of regulation 
(whether tools of state law or non-law mechanisms) each regulating 
one another – is a key feature of contemporary governance".126 Parker 
argues, "that it is possible, in principle at least, to imagine (and 
even to see partial examples) of meta-regulation that holds business 
organisations accountable for putting in place corporate conscience 
processes that are aimed at substantive social values".127 In the field 
of self-regulatory corporate governance codes, the legal basis to "apply 
or explain, that and why they don't comply" with the code designated 
by the legislator could be regarded as meta-regulation. Parker suggests 
that, in order for laws to successfully meta-regulate CSR, they must:
(1)   be aimed at making sure that companies meet "values that transcend 
  narrow self-interest";
(2)  be aimed at making sure that these values are built into the practice 
  and the structure of the enterprise; and
(3)  recognise that the main goals of the organisation are still to be  
  pursued within the responsibility framework.128
It goes beyond the scope of this lecture to further delve into this 
important aspect of CSR regulation and in particular compliance, 
but it will certainly be a topic for further analysis in the future. That 
research cannot be performed in splendid legal isolation. Although 
corporations may have a conscience, in practice decisions compliant 
with responsibilities are human actions. Interestingly, also in the 
context of "regulating CSR", the report on the EU conference, which 
I mentioned earlier, does not address the concept of CSR from a legal 
or regulatory point of view and follows the traditional EU voluntary 
approach for CSR. The report, however, notes, that while "analysis 
had revealed that the forms of CSR preferred by companies were 
125  I note, that the EU Commission or the EU Courts so far have not been prepared to use this type 
 of metaregulation in the fight against EU competition law violations.
126  Parker 2007, p. 208.
127  Parker 2007, p. 209.
128  Parker 2007, p. 215-217.
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unilaterally imposed codes of practice and ethics charters, a process 
could be observed whereby over time CSR becomes "legalised" through 
the creation of legal and paralegal instruments". The conference report, 
however, also refers to the conclusion of one of the research teams, 
"that responsibility is fundamentally an individual issue and needs to 
be studied as such. There is a need for research that focuses on internal 
learning and change processes. This requires detailed research over 
time, including inputs from psychology and neuroscience, as well as 
sociology and organisational theory, in order to gain an understanding 
of what goes on in peoples' minds when they make decisions".129 
It shows how complex the issue of responsibility is and that the 
role of meta-regulation may become an important topic for cross- 
disciplinary research. Law should not be left out of this research as 
the work by Tom Tyler on legal compliance shows: his fascinating book 
is entitled "Why people obey the law" without a question mark.130
Before going into the thick of corporate law and address the 
three themes I would like to explore, I should mention the disciplinary 
effect of transparency and business reporting, my third concentric 
circle. Sybren de Hoo mentioned the ambitious GRI Guidelines for 
integrated reporting on financials and so-called non-financials, the 
latter of which include the Triple P domains.131 Denmark was the 
first country to require extended non-financial reporting systems for 
its bigger companies.132 Companies that already use the GRI-framework 
are exempt from this requirement. The EU Commission is expected 
to come out later in this year with its report on its 2010 consultation 
on mandatory CSR-reporting133, following the rather non-committal 
EU Modernisation Directive of 2003.134
6.5 Company law, changing paradigms in the shadow of CSR
6.5.1.  Constitutional foundation; the company's interest as  
pluralist concept
The first of my three themes on company law goes to the heart 
of the corporation, its constitutional foundation.135 There are three 
main schools of thought. Originally a corporation was a concession 
129  See also Heugens, Kaptein and van Oosterhout 2007 on the relation between responsibility and  
 organisation.
130  Tyler 2006.
131  de Hoo 2011, p. 43, see also Raaijmakers 2005 on the limited prospect of discipline by transparency.
132  Denmark: Danish Financial Statements Act, which came into force on January 1, 2009
133  EU Public consultation on disclosure of non-financial information by companies, 23.11.2010 – 24.01.2011
134  Kamp-Roelands & van der Zanden 2005, Lambooy 2010, chapter 4, Eijsbouts 2010, par 4.
135  Kerr, Janda & Pitts 2009, chapter 3.
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or licence granted by the government whether or not based on an 
act of parliament to a number of natural persons who had requested 
the concession to raise capital for a defined purpose and specifically 
approved with the privilege of limited liability for the incorporators. 
The justification of this limited liability was to be found in the 
public interest, which the corporation would serve. Although 
elements of this original characteristic of the corporation can still 
be traced in certain jurisdictions136, over the centuries the concession 
aspect disappeared and today, if there still is a concession aspect 
involved137, it is not linked to any specified and defined public 
interest, unless of course the corporation's aims and objects are 
precisely geared to a defined public function.138 As the public 
purpose and the requirement of a concession disappeared and 
corporations started to grow and raise capital on regulated stock 
exchanges to expand their business, by which the ownership 
became dispersed, the relation between management and these 
owners received close attention. As agents or trustees for the owners, 
who had decreasing control over them, managers were able to 
serve their own interest at the expense of the owners. This 
contractual agency relationship therefore became the central 
point of focus in the conceptual approach of corporations. Hence 
the emphasis on the notion that corporations would be merely 
a legal fiction and in fact no more than a nexus of contracts. The 
pivotal one of these contracts was the agency contract between the 
owners and the managers, hence the name agency or contractual 
theory. This concept also implies that the shareholders not only 
own the company but also its assets, which are entrusted to the 
managers based on their so-called fiduciary duty. This concept is 
also referred to as the shareholder model in corporate law, since 
the corporation is basically indentified with its shareholders. Agency 
theory has long prevailed in Anglo-American corporate law systems 
and traces can still be found. The modern view of the corporation, 
however, is based on the concept that it is a legal institution in its 
own right, owning its assets and being responsible for its liabilities. 
This is the constitutional concept of the corporation which is 
characterized by a multitude of constituencies, management, 
shareholders, creditors, employees, suppliers and customers, local 
136  Such as the requirement of government approval for incorporation, recently abolished in 
 the Netherlands.
137  E.g. consisting of the requirement of governmental approval for incorporation and the articles 
 of association. 
138  Note, that for these cases specific conditions have been formulated by law or even specific forms of  
 incorporation have been developed. De Jongh, Schild and Timmerman 2010 and 2011.
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communities and authorities, hence the name stakeholder model. 
Stephen Bottomley's summary of the constitutionalist theory 
encapsulates the elements from the three visions: 
"The theory of corporate constitution begins with the proposition that 
corporations are more than just artificially created legal institutions (contrary 
to the suggestion of contrary to the suggestion of concession theory) and 
they are more than just economic institutions (contrary to the argument of 
contract-based theories). Corporations have both these dimensions, but they 
are also social enterprises and they are polities in their own right." 139
My proposal is that the constitutional vision of the company with its 
pluralist approach, reflected in the notion "the interest of the company" 
(het vennootschappelijk belang) which has been one of the principles 
of Dutch140 and other continental-European jurisdictions, and which 
has been adopted in the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, will be 
reflected in the Dutch Companies' Act.141 Not in a structural sense 
as happened in 1971, when labour was given the right to co-determine 
the composition of the Dutch supervisory board of the big companies, 
but in the specification of the duty of care of management.142 The 
proposal is to adopt the duty of care guidelines for UK directors, as 
reflected in section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006, in our Dutch 
Civil Code in order to clarify the current undefined and much debated 
notion "the company's interest" in art. 2:140.2 Dutch Civil Code.143 
Section 172 UK Companies Act stipulates, that UK- Directors must promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members and in doing 
so have regard to various factors, e.g.
-  the likely consequences of any decision in the long term;
-  the interests of employees;
-  the need to foster the company's relationships with; 
 suppliers, customers and others;
139  S. Bottomley, “The Birds, the Beasts and the Bat: Developing a Constitutionalist Theory of Corporate  
  Regulation” (1999), 27 Fed. L.Rev. 243 at 255, cited in Kerr, Landa &Pitts 2009; see also the report on 
Ruggie’s Corporate Law Project on the possibilities to reflect the need for corporations to respect 
human rights in company and securities laws (Ruggie 2010).  
140 Eijsbouts 2010, par 5.2, Eijsbouts 2011.
141  Eijsbouts 2010, par. 8.2.
142  See Timmerman 2009, who signals the trend to no longer provide stakeholder influence through  
 measures in the structure of companies, but to arrange for adequate attention to stakeholders’ interest 
 through more specified and targeted duties of care of management. See on the latter also Raaijmakers  
  2005, Tjong Tjin Tai 2007, Heineman 2008, de Waard 2008, Steins Bisschop 2008 and Assink 2007 and 
2009.  
143   See Eijsbouts 2010 for a concise review of the various visions and interpretations of the nature and 
the content of the notion “company’s interest”, see also Assink 2010 and, for the role of the company’s 
interest in hostile takeover procedures, Steins Bisschop 2008 and van Ginneken 2010.
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-  the impact of operations on the community and the environment;
-  the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high  
 standards of business conduct.
This new UK approach is called the "enlightened shareholder value" 
model.144 A real pluralist approach is not (yet) achieved since other 
than the shareholders, interested stakeholders have not been given 
the possibility to enforce this duty in court against allegedly negligent 
directors. Therefore, my proposal would be to grant those stakeholders, 
acknowledged or to have been acknowledged as such by the company 
pursuant to principle II.1 of the Corporate Governance Code and 
(threatened to be) affected by structural negligence by management 
of its duty to take their interests into account, a conditional right of 
action. It would entail the possibility of an official inquiry into possible 
mismanagement ordered by the Enterprise Chamber. To avoid abuse 
of this right, interested stakeholders should file their request with 
the Advocate General at the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, who shall 
scrutinize the request and if found sufficiently substantiated by him or 
her, file the official request on their behalf with the Enterprise Chamber. 
It would be extension of the AG's right to request an official inquiry 
in the public interest.145 
I have raised this idea before146, but to no avail.147 I am convinced, 
however, that the current debate on the conceptual foundations of the 
corporate form justifies an indepth study. The idea for such a radical 
departure from the traditional shareholder model in company law is in 
line with many suggestions from CSR proponents148 and even mentioned 
in the recent EU Corporate Governance Green book149 questionnaire as 
a topic for consideration. The EU Green Paper on Corporate Governance 
and the Report of the EU Reflection Group are examples of the concerns, 
which have been raised by the developments leading to the financial, 
economic and public debt crisis and the roles of business in modern 
society.  It would also nicely tie in with Ruggie's Corporate Law project, 
which aimed at possibilities to use company law as a means to make 
company boards more accountable for their corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights.150 Finally, the recent report of the EU Reflection 
144  Davies 2005, Horrigan 2011, part 3, point 7, Timmerman 2009 and de Kluiver 2009, Calkoen 2011, par 2.6.3 
145  Boukema 1969, Schmieman 2004, Eijsbouts 2010, par. 8.3, Mok 2004.
146  Eijsbouts 2010.
147  Handelingen NJV 2010-2, question 2. 
148  Horrigan 2011, chapter 10; Porter & Kramer 2011, Sjåfjell 2009 and 2011 and de Hoo & Olaerts 2011.
149  EU EUROPEAN COMMISSION GREEN PAPER The EU corporate governance framework, Brussels, 
 5.4.201, COM(2011) 164 final.
150  Ruggie 2010, analysis of 40 major jurisdictions by 19 major international law firms.
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Group suggests to offer companies the possibility to adopt a more 
stakeholder oriented approach in their policies and practices.151
6.5.2. Corporate groups; aligning law with economic reality
Let me now turn to my second major revision proposal in company law. 
This relates to the possibility to align corporate group law with economic 
and organisational reality. Current corporate group law is still centred on 
the individual company concept with all its requisites.152 These include 
limited liability for the shareholders and managing directors, the duty 
for the latter to take into account the interest of the individual company 
(depending on the relevant jurisdiction of the subsidiary company 
reflecting either a shareholder or a stakeholder model), different regimes 
for capitalisation and creditor protection. In some jurisdictions the 
possibility exists of holding the shareholders liable via an "internally 
routed" piercing the corporate veil process or via "externally routed" 
legal concepts, such as principal-agency concepts or identification 
(vereenzelviging) of legal entities.153 
There are three main reasons for a fundamental review of this model, 
based on the individual legal entity.154 The first one is the frequently 
occurring incongruity between the primordial organisational structure 
of the group and its legal structure.155 Organisational lines of command 
frequently cross or skip one or more individual legal entity borders 
for a variety of reasons (such as historic reasons or the establishment 
of national holdings for tax or financial consolidation). In order to 
structure the internal organisational lines of command the group 
establishes, next to its business mission statement, vision and values 
principles, such instruments as codes of conduct and detailed approval 
and authority schedules as well as detailed reporting models, again all 
based primarily on organisational structure rather than legal structure. 
Business managers, who frequently do not have a legal position in the 
group companies, which are involved in their business decisions, rely 
on the Legal Department for the necessary corporate housekeeping 
to secure that their business decisions and actions are reconciled 
with the formal legal requirements. The second reason is a corporate 
governance reason. Most prevailing corporate governance regimes 
151  EU Reflection Group on Company Law 2011.
152  Lennarts 1999, Raaijmakers 2009, EU Reflection Group on company law 2011, Chapter 4.
153  Lennarts 2002, Timmerman 2002, Vandekerckhove 2007, Bartman & Dorrestein 2009. 
154  EU Reflexion Group 2011, Chapter 4. 
155  Van den Ingh 2002, Lennarts 2002, Muchlinski 2007, van der Sangen 2009.
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require extensive risk management and control systems.156 In order 
to implement these control requirements detailed reporting and 
monitoring systems have been developed which enable the group 
parent company's managing directors to follow the operations of 
the business groups and legal entities closely. These developments 
have raised the idea of constitutionalization of multinationals. 
Multinationals have their own internal governance structures that 
have to be in line with the various external legal regimes and 
national and international codes governing the group operations 
worldwide on the one hand and their complex internal structures 
on the other hand. Ideas to come to grasp with these possibly 
conflicting frameworks, securing at the same time legitimacy also 
towards the outside world(s), have been formulated. Teubner has 
been the creative inventor of this concept. Others followed suit.157 An 
interesting topic in this area is privacy protection, another CSR and 
human rights concern. In order to reconcile the cross border privacy 
data communication needs of multinationals on the one hand and 
the manifold differing national and supranational regimes in this 
field on the other hand, the concept of so-called "binding corporate 
rules" (BCR) was developed. The data protection authorities assembled 
in the so-called Art 29 Working Party158 embarked on a model to 
endorse rules in this respect that may assist the multinationals in 
bad need of harmonisation in this area.159 The binding corporate rules 
regime provides for a specific internal data protection governance and 
security system, which will allow the free cross border flow of data 
within the multinational group, subject to the many data protection 
regimes applicable to the group.160 I mention in particular the 
requirements that the BCR should incorporate the material data 
processing principles (transparency, fairness, purpose limitation, 
data quality, rights of individuals and security) and restrictions on 
onward transfers (rule v) and that the BCR should be internally 
binding within the organisation (on all group companies and on 
emloyees) and externally binding for the benefit of individuals 
(i.e. must create third-party beneficiary rights for individuals (rule vi).161 
156  Schoordijk 2005 and Strik 2009; see also Eijsbouts 2010, par 7.3. Cf also the US Sarbanes Oxley Act S.  
 404, on the internal control systems primarily aimed at integrity of the financial accounting system  
 and the resulting financials in periodic reports. 
157   Teubner 2009a, Lambooy 2011, who envisions the future development of a Multinational Companies 
Constitution and provides a possible framework with procedural elements. 
158  The Working Party 29 is an advisory body for the EU Commission established under article 29 of the  
 EU Data Protection Directive. See for the international governance framework of data protection rules  
 in general and the workings of the binding corporate rules. Moerel 2011.
159  Moerel 2011, par. 6.1 under the telling title “data here, data there, data everywhere”, p 179
160  Moerel 2011, par. 10.2, p. 272-276.
161 Moerel 2011, p. 274 and 275.
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The third reason is that regulators or courts disregard the legal structure 
and give precedence to the organisational lines of command in their 
approach of corporate groups. This happens frequently in competition 
law enforcement procedures both in the administrative and criminal 
aspects162 as well as in the civil damages context. 
For these reasons my proposal would be to look again at the suggestion 
by Slagter in 1988163 to consider the possibility of a legal entity status for 
the corporate group as such, of course next to the different legal entities 
which compose the group. It would be a challenging project, as Slagter's 
discussion with Raaijmakers has shown164, but my assumption is that it 
is worthwhile considering, particularly with a view to avoid the need of 
cutting the Gordian knot in cases where organisational responsibilities 
and legal responsibilities cannot be reconciled or the latter are even 
impossible to identify. Of course the important developments in 
governance systems and the protection of minority shareholders and 
creditors of group subsidiaries need careful attention. 
6.5.3  Multinational enterprise liability; fundamental rights and global 
remedies 
My final major revision proposal relates to the remedy of corporate 
violations of fundamental rights of third parties by legal entities within 
legal groups. This proposal is a corollary from the first and second 
proposals and is aimed a trying and establishing a multinational 
enterprise liability system for these violations.165 – The concept of 
multinational enterprise liability was first developed in the context of 
the Bhopal disaster in 1984.166 These revision aspects of the proposal are 
the establishment of global substantive liability norms and the review of 
161  Moerel 2011, p. 274 and 275.
162  ECJ Akzo Nobel NV and Others v Commission (C-97/08 P), Olaerts & Cauffmann 2011.
163  Slagter 1988, Blumberg 1993, Eijsbouts 2010.
164  Raaijmakers 1990, Slagter 1990, Timmerman 2002, Muchlinski 2007 and Eijsbouts 2010.
165   Hofstetter 1990, who analyses from the “law and sociology” as well as “law and economics” 
perspectives the principle of legal independence of group subsidiaries operating in so-called host countries. 
Hofstetter clarfies that the principle of International Social Efficieny (ISE), which has helped in formulating 
the concept of “optimal tariffs” in the area of international trade, could in the same vein be expected to 
lend itself toward the development of optimal MNE liability regimes in the area of international direct 
investment. ISE is used by Hofstetter along the “Kaldor-Hicks” concept of efficiency, i.e. a rule is efficient 
if its gains to some actors exceed its losses to others. The compensation of the losers by the winners is 
not dealt with by Hofstetter, but is nevertheless assumed by him to happen (note 30 to his article). This 
assumption needs careful CSR scrutiny.
166  Van Rooij 1990.
167   In this respect I deviate from the proponents of so-called foreign direct liability (FDL), and its most 
expansive form being the litigation on the basis of the US Alien Torts Statute of 1789, which should give 
foreign plaintiffs access to US courts in cases against foreign corporations. See Castermans & van der 
Weide 2009, Augusteinm 2010, Enneking e.a. 2011. See for my reasons to deviate from FDL Eijsbouts 
2010, par. 8.4, and Handelingen NJV 2010-2, question 3. See also Zerk 2006, p. 240 who concurs in my 
views on FDL and Stiglitz 2006 on global norms and a global court. 
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cases by a supranational forum, such as the WTO. 167 The WTO often tries 
cases involving the claims by multinationals as investors, but the WTO 
should be taking also cases against multinationals who are not living 
up to their responsibilities in the host country.168 The idea is that the 
management board of the parent company is supposed to be in control 
of those operations of the subsidiaries of the group that may affect 
the fundamental rights of third parties. And this is for two reasons: 
infringing those rights may lead to high risks for the company, but it 
may also lead to high risks for the third party rights holders.169 
Cases in point are Shell in Nigeria and BP in the Gulf of Mexico. It 
is Ruggie's philosophy to see his due diligence system work both 
ways, that is preventing legal and reputational risks for the company 
as well as preventing possible damage to third parties by the 
operations of the company.170 This is a novel departure from the 
traditional approach to due diligence, which was primarily concerned 
with the protection of the position of the company itself.171 Of 
course harming third parties may also be a risk factor for the company 
itself172, but the angle to look particularly to the position of the third 
parties, regardless of whether there is risk of damage for the company 
itself, is new. 
An additional aspect of my proposal would be to reverse the burden 
of proof for the third party. Again, for the same reasons as mentioned 
above in the second proposal, when I spoke of the difficulty to 
identify exactly the right person or legal entity not only to have 
been involved in but also to have violated the relevant duty of care, 
this reversal of the burden of proof would be realistic. It would 
be compatible with the in control rules and mechanisms of the 
multinational on the one hand and with the practically impossible 
situation of the damaged party to find out and prove the relevant 
facts in the case on the other hand. As I said already, ideally, these 
cases should in my opinion neither be tried in court in the home 
state of the multinational nor in the host state against the 
multinational. In both cases the court could be prejudiced against 
the foreign party in the case. In addition, the level playing field sought 
by this proposal would not be realised.173
168  Burianski 2007.
169  See van Genugten & Jägers 2003 on the binding effect of human rights on corporations.
170  See Schweisfurth 2011 for an indepth analysis of the responses by mutinationals to the allegations of  
 human rights abuses by them, as published by THE BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE  
 (http://www.business-humanrights.org/Aboutus/Briefdescription).
171  Brink 2011.
172  See Ruggie 2008, point 4, p 6, see also point 51, p 14-16, where Ruggie provides a list of human rights  
 relevant for business, drawn from over 300 reports of alleged corporate-related human rights abuses;  
 see also Ward 2003 and Zerk 2006.
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173  van Dam 2008, p. 51.
174 See the HiiL Law of the future project, which offers a fascinating look at the prospects of the  
 development of law in three possible scenarios for the coming 20 years (www. Lawofthefuture.org) 
 and the collection of think pieces which have contributed to the conception of these scenarios. These  
 think pieces are assembled in Muller e.a. 2011, which is also available on line (FICHL Publication Series  
 No. 11; Publication Series The Law of the Future and the Future of Law - FICHL
 (www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_11_Web.pdf ). 
7. From Practice to Theory, Epilogue
As mentioned in the introduction, little could I imagine in 2005 that 
the writing of an article would result in my appointment at this 
University in this very elegant and enjoyable city, which now includes 
the neighbouring village of Heer in which I was born, but, hopefully more 
interesting to you, would result in this inaugural lecture. I would now like 
to address also in particular our students.
My aim has been not only to provide a critical note to the still prevailing 
view that CSR is voluntary and to provide hopefully convincing arguments 
that law and regulation are important for CSR, but also to demonstrate 
that CSR is a fascinating theme for law students and to propose possible 
new avenues for corporate law. Once voluntarism has been unmasked 
as non-essential characteristic of CSR, wide panoramas open up for 
lawyers. The "trade mark" of our university, problem based learning, is 
well served by the multifaceted topic CSR, since, as I have illustrated, it 
covers many fields of legal theory and practice, nationally, internationally 
and, increasingly important, also transnationally. We have crossed many 
borders: those between law and non-law, between national law and 
international law both public and private, between international law 
and transnational law, between public and private national law, between 
public regulation and private regulation, between law and economics, 
between law and sociology, between law and politics, between law and 
justice, between law and morals and, finally, between law and ethics, both 
in theory and in practice. CSR covers all of these territories, regardless of 
whether it is characterized by those who deem it fit for their purposes 
as being limited to the "beyond the law" territory. It puts the law as 
traditional and still primary method of regulation of the relationship 
between business and society in the context of a quickly emerging 
international and transnational pluralistic regulatory landscape. It offers 
today's students, our tomorrow's lawyers, a kaleidoscopic view on 
tomorrow's role of law and regulation in business as an increasingly 
influential player in the governance of an ever more complex and 
globalising society.174 The master theses which I have supervised this 
past year show, how this CSR topic has sparked interest with our 
students in diverse national, transnational and international legal 
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aspects, ranging from the hardening effect in the soft law based OECD 
guidelines for MNC's 2011, via the contractualisation of human rights 
in the clothing industry's supply chain implementing Ruggie's 
Guidelines 2011 and the CSR transparency in disclosure regulation in 
the US vs. that in The Netherlands, to the whistle blowing provisions 
of the Dodd Frank Act in the US in comparison with the whistle 
blowing provisions in German Labour law, particularly in the field 
of anti-bribery legislation. It has been a stimulating experience and 
with colleague Sybren de Hoo I am looking forward to the coming 
years and to the inspiring contacts and conversations with our many 
international students, by which also my international outlook on 
the world's development continues to be guaranteed. The positive 
criticism we received on this first year's course will be taken on board 
to further improve the course, the topic of which as such 
already received a high grade.
Next to education I am looking forward to participate, with the ICGI 
team, in those research topics which are geared to improving 
governance, including CSR, and corporate law as its core to enhance 
the role of the integral governance framework in supporting 
corporate policies which improve sustainable business. The proposals 
I have made this afternoon in this connection will of course belong 
to my research agenda.
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Ladies and gentlemen, acknowledgements are owed to many people 
at the end of my inaugural lecture175 and a very long afternoon. So 
first of all, I like to thank you all for coming to our launching event. 
Then, I would like to thank those, who have contributed to my legal 
education, starting at Groningen University in 1964, and my practical 
experience during my 36-year tenure as corporate counsel in fine 
companies with great colleagues. I mention one of them in particular: 
Professor Cor Uniken Venema, my inspiring teacher of Anglo American 
Law in Groningen and later dedicated tutor in my first job at Philips, 
who enthused me to become an international corporate counsel and 
convinced me to abandon the idea to start as an advocaat, at least 
until 2001, when I joined the bar as Cohen Advocaat. 
Outside the legal field I had the privilege to work with many great 
and inspiring colleagues, but I specifically mention my two CEO's at 
Akzo Nobel, Kees van Lede and Hans Wijers, under whose leadership 
I was entrusted with the task to manage the legal teams in all 
major transactions from 1993 onwards, which transformed the hybrid 
Akzo group, which I joined in 1989, to the focused AkzoNobel, which I 
left in 2007. But perhaps more importantly, they supported me 
throughout in my endeavours to further the right legal and, together 
with my colleague Andre Veneman, ethical compliance culture at the 
company, which brought a great and valuable experience also for my 
current capacity.  
This brings me to Professor Menno Kamminga's call, end of 
November 2009, with his straightforward question: how about 
becoming a professor of CSR in Maastricht? One month later Dean 
Professor Aalt-Willem Heringa and Menno convinced me, that this 
totally unexpected switch to academia was the right choice to 
combine a long international legal experience in practice with an 
increasing interest in the nature and workings of law and regulation 
in society. Menno and Aalt-Willem, I owe you both a great debt of 
gratitude for your endeavours to support my appointment by the 
Board of the Stichting Wetenschapsbeoefening UM in this capacity. 
Menno, you deserve additional thanks for your continuing guidance 
in my induction program. It became, however, very soon clear to me, 
175  I am grateful to the following persons in particular for taking the trouble to read an earlier draft of this  
 lecture and to offer their valuable comments and suggestions: Jim Brumm, who was kind enough to  
 also screen the draft on English, Tom Eijsbouts, Sybren de Hoo, Kid Schwarz and Birgit Spiesshofer.
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that my colleagues Professors Kid Schwarz and Bas Steins Bisschop 
had been the actual drivers of my appointment and, Kid and Bas, that 
knowledge increased my appetite even more. My debt is certainly owed 
to you as well!
Having worked now for a year at the Institute whose launch is getting to 
its end in a couple of minutes, I must also thank my other direct colleagues 
at ICGI, in particular Christine van Basten, Mieke Olaerts, Jos Hamers and 
Yvonne Walhof for their dedicated and highly valued support in my 
initiation, both scientifically and organisationally, in this new world. 
Finally in Maastricht, my collega proximus, Professor Sybren de Hoo: 
Syb, it has been a great pleasure, right from our first meeting and 
dinner, working together on the creation of the curriculum for and the 
teaching in our CSR course in the master Globalisation and Law. Coming 
from very different corporate corners, but valuing the potential of our 
complementary fields of experience, we have taken on the challenge 
of creating, with our excellent leaders of our tutorial groups Anna 
Beckers and Valentina Vadi, an inspiring CSR course for law students 
from many different nationalities and legal study orientation. I look 
forward to continue working with you in the coming years with the 
same good spirits to offer our students hopefully challenging and 
relevant education for their future contribution to a better world.
Last but by no means least I must address my direct personal 
stakeholders, my family. Roderick and Charlotte, partners Anna and Sebas, 
and grandsons Renzo and Klaas: we are teaching our students, that 
stakeholder engagement is of crucial importance. If my international 
corporate counsel career and subsequent professional challenges did 
not always allow me bringing this theory in practice fully, I pray for 
your understanding and look forward to be the engaged father and 
grandfather you all deserve. It goes without saying, however, that my 
primary engagement focus will be my better self, Gabriella: you have 
been supporting me tremendously over all those years, even if I tested 
your patience unduly and took on too many additional burdens. My 
pledge is, that this lecture was the last one of those. 
Ik heb gezegd.
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